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INTRODUCTION 
 
The European Union Directive on Takeover Bids
1
 (Directive on Takeover Bids or 
Directive) establishes a legal framework for takeover bids among Member States. The 
transactions targeted in the Directive are takeover bids which could be theoretically defined as 
general or public offer to all the shareholders of a target company.
2
 The Directive applies to 
companies where all or some of its shares are listed in one or several Member States
3
 and it is 
the choice of the Member State itself whether to apply the regulation also to companies not 
listed.
4
 According to the prior the share purchase transactions analysed in the thesis are firmly 
determined and do not extend to other share purchase transactions. 
A regulatory framework for the European Member States regarding the usage of 
defensive measures against hostile takeovers has been given in Articles 9, 11 and 12 of the 
Directive. The board neutrality rule in Article 9, breakthrough rule in Article 11 and 
optionality-reciprocity clauses in Article 12 regulate the post- and pre-bid defences the 
companies can put in action in case they become a target to a hostile takeover bid.  
In the essence of the thesis and a takeover transaction lies control over the target 
company that the bidder aims to attain.
5
 The control is achieved when the bidder has acquired 
enough shares in the target company to influence its business decisions and is able to appoint 
directors to the board of the company.
6
 A hostile takeover has been defined to occur where the 
launched bid is against the will of the target company’s management and directors of the 
board.
7
 Hostility could signify also a broader concept where an offer is aggressively rejected 
by the target company as a whole.
8
 The reason behind mobilizing against a takeover by the 
board, the employees or the management lies in the variety of controversial parties and their 
affected interests the takeover transaction possesses.
9
 The arguments for rejecting the 
                                                          
1 European Parliament and the Council of European Union 21 April 2004 Directive 2004/25/EC on takeover 
bids. – L 142, 30.04.2004, pp 12-23 
2
 P. Davis, K. Hopt. Control Transactions. in R. Kraakman, et al, (eds). The Anatomy of Corporate Law: A 
Comparative and Functional Approach. New York: Oxford University Press 2009, pp 225-227 
3
 B. Sjåfjell. Towards a sustainable European company law: A Normative Analysis of the Objectives of EU Law, 
with the Takeover Directive as a Test Case. The Netherlands: Wolters Kluwer 2009, p 297;  Recital 1 in the 
Directive on Takeover Bids 
4
 Additional restrictions are set out in Article 1 of the Directive on Takeover Bids 
5 B. Sjåfjell. 2009, p 296 
5
 B. Sjåfjell. 2009, p 118 
6
 C. Clerc, et al. (eds). A Legal and Economic Assessment of European Takeover Regulation. – Marccus Partners 
and Centre for European Policy Studies 2012, p 129. – Available: http://www.ceps.eu/book/legal-and-
economic-assessment-european-takeover-regulation, (15.03.2013) 
7
 A. Schianchi, A. Mantovi. A Theory of Hostile Takeovers. – The IUP Journal of Mergers and Acquisitions Sept 
2007, p 4.  – Available: http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=901956, (12.01.2014) 
8 G.W. Schwert. Hostility in Takeovers: In the Eyes of the Be holder?.  – Journal of Finance, 2000 No 6, p 2600 
9 B. Sjåfjell. 2009, p 296 and p 117;  
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potential takeover could result from its abusive nature and a gross asymmetry of information
10
 
the acquirer discloses or more accurately declines to disclose about its intentions towards the 
target company.
 
Also the target company or the government of the Member State where the 
target company is listed could want to sustain the target company’s unanimity and 
development in a long-term perspective. In short, the hostility towards takeovers accrues from 
the resistance by the target company as a whole and by third parties whose interests could be 
affected. 
From the economical point of view takeovers could be profitable. They have been seen 
beneficial in terms of improvement of resource allocation, synergistic gains, solving agency 
problems and for accurate market valuation.
11
 In comparison with friendly takeovers the 
commentators often bring forth that hostile takeovers generally cause higher price reactions 
for the target shareholders
12
 which is argued to be the main positive reason for their 
justification. Nonetheless, a number of studies indicate also negative effects of hostile 
takeovers on the long-term performance of target companies.
13
  
Takeover defences are designed to slow down the process of an uninvited bid
14
 by 
either making the company unattractive or more costly to acquire. Post-bid defences are put in 
place after the company has become a subject to the takeover bid.
15
 The core issue in such 
circumstances is to whom should be given the right to decide upon adopting and utilizing 
those measures – to the shareholders or to the board of the target company. Pre-bid defences 
are aimed to prevent sudden and unexpected hostile bids before the management-board is able 
to assess their options.
16
 Pre-bid defences are used as barriers to a takeover of company’s 
shares or barriers for shareholders to exercise the control that the shares represent at the 
general meeting.
17
 Numerous commentators argue that defensive measures have destructive 
effect, destroy shareholder value
18
 and that they raise the cost and reduce the benefits of a 
                                                          
10
 C. Clerc.  et al, (eds), op. cit., p 120; Information asymmetry creates a situation where because of the 
uncertainty over the target company’s future development the inetrested parties inside of the target company 
could resist the bid. 
11
 W. Magnuson. Takeover Regulation in the United States and Europe: An Institutional Approach. – Pace 
International Law Review, 2009/21 No 1, p 235 
12
 M. Martynova, L.D.R. Renneboog. The performance of the European market for corporate control: Evidence 
from the 5th takeover wave. – European Financial Management, 2011a/17 No 2, p 248 
13 M. Martynova, S. Oosting, L. Renneboog. The long-term operating performance of european mergers and 
acquisitions – ECGI Finance Working Paper no 137/2006, p 19. - Available: 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=944407 (15.01.2014) 
14
 D. DePamphilis. Mergers and acquisitions basics. Oxford: Elsevier, 2011, p 73 
15
 C. Clerc, et al, (eds), op. cit., p 85; Most commonly used post-bid defences among others are poison pills, pac-
man defence, greenmail, white knight, white squire and share repurchases. 
16
 D. DePamphilis. op. cit., p 73 
17 C. Clerc. et al, (eds), op. cit., p 85 
18 R.W. Masulis, C.Wang, F. Xie. Corporate Governance and acquirer returns. – Journal of Finance, 2007/62 No 
4, p 1852 
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takeover for the bidder
19
.  Nonetheless, both post- and pre-bid defensive measures are widely 
practiced and possess a variety of positive and beneficial effects for the target company.  
 
The aim of the thesis is to analyse whether the initial objectives set to Articles 9, 11 
and 12 regulating the usage of defensive measures against hostile takeovers in the European 
Directive on Takeover Bids are in conformity with the actual impacts and effects of the 
articles deriving from the legal regulation interpretation and implementation analysis. In 
accordance with the results, the proposals for possible regulatory amendments to the articles 
regarding the board neutrality rule, the breakthrough rule and optionality-reciprocity clauses 
will be made.  
Thesis concentrates firmly on analysing the defensive measures against hostile 
takeovers regulation in the scope of the Directive on Takeover Bids. The review over the 
implementation of the Directive’s regulation in different Member States is merely taken as a 
comparison for indicating diversities the takeover defences regulation in the Directive would 
possess. Member States under the examination – the United Kingdom, the Netherlands and 
Estonia – are chosen based on the controversial and rather opposite viewpoints and regulation 
implementation these Member States represent. 
Based on the latter the hypothesis is established – The initial objectives set to the defensive 
measures regulation are in conformity with the actual impacts. 
 
In the thesis the author is using various analysing methods. In the analysis of the 
theoretical grounds and initial objectives is used qualitative method. In the analysis of the 
defensive measures regulation is mostly used systematic method for understanding the 
Articles 9, 11 and 12 in the Directive, their interrelations and impacts in concurrence with 
each other. By analysing the implementation of defensive measures regulation in United 
Kingdom, the Netherlands and Estonia the comparative method is used for comparing 
takeover laws in different legal systems. In the analysis over the conformity between the 
initial objectives and actual impacts is mostly used qualitative method which is supported by 
statistical data. In the section of introducing possible changes to the defensive measures 
regulation is used modelling method. 
Thesis is divided into five chapters by following the aim of verifying or disconfirming 
with the hypothesis established to the thesis.  
                                                          
19 M. Ventoruzzo. The Thirteenth Directive and the Contrasts Between European and U.S. Takeover Regulation: 
Different Regulatory Means, Not so Different Political and Economic Ends. – Texas International Law Journal, 
2006/41 No 2, p 177 
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In the first chapter an overview is given about the theoretical grounds behind the initial 
objectives for understanding the reasons for setting such goals to the articles regulating the 
defensive measures against hostile takeovers in the Directive on Takeover Bids. The usage of 
these underlying theories has significant influence on both the initial objectives and on the 
actual outcome results which is the reason why a short overview of these theories is crucial 
for the thesis.  
In the second chapter of the thesis the board neutrality rule in Article 9 of the Directive 
on Takeover Bids is analysed. Firstly, there is given an overview of the objectives set to the 
rule which the requirement was aimed at achieving through the regulation and its 
implementation. Secondly, the regulation and its implementation has been analysed more 
profoundly for detecting the actual impacts the board neutrality has had or would have. Based 
on the latter, the outcomes of the board neutrality rule are presented and their conformity with 
the initial objectives analysed. Chapters three and four analysing the Articles 11 and 12 
respectively follow the outline set out in the second chapter. Article 12 does not embody a 
rule for defensive measures against hostile takeovers such as Articles 9 and 11 but regulates 
the usage of the rules. The reasons for Article 12 to form a separate chapter lies in that it 
firstly, pertains to both Articles 9 and 11, and secondly, attaching the analysis of Article 12 to 
both Articles 9 and 11 would increase the capacity groundlessly. In the final chapter the 
outcome from hypothesis analysis is represented together with the reasoning behind the 
outcome results and introduction of possible changes to the Directive on Takeover Bids for 
the future.  
In the thesis are used different materials for analysing the validity of set hypothesis. 
The most important materials are legislations – especially the Directive on Takeover Bids but 
in addition regulations from several Member States. In addition to legal regulation the case 
law is used. An important part in the analysis form several different legal and economic 
reports regarding the defensive measures regulation in the Directive. Important sources for the 
thesis are also numerous academic articles and books. 
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1. Grounds for establishing unitary takeover defences regulation  
1.1. Takeovers in Europe and the adoption of European Directive on Takeover Bids 
 
Takeovers are regarded to be less common in Europe than in United States.
20
 However, 
the United Kingdom attracts takeovers with its highly liquid financial market, making it 
clearly the leading takeover market in European Union.
21
 According to Figure 1 in the Annex, 
the financial crisis has lowered the number of takeovers occurring in United Kingdom 
remarkably while leaving the figures in Continental Europe relatively unchanged. These 
results exhibit that takeovers perform a fairly important and stable role in Continental Europe 
and should not be underestimated as a financial market in comparison with United Kingdom.  
The first proposal for the Directive was presented to the European Council already in 
1989 and the second proposal was published in 1996.
22
 During the first considerations of the 
Directive only few Member States had their own regulation governing takeovers – United 
Kingdom as a leading takeover bid market in Europe had regulated takeovers including 
defensive measures against hostile takeovers for a long period. The latter was the argument 
for favouring the United Kingdom’s City Code23 to be taken as the basis of the Directive 
because of its development and high takeover activity on United Kingdom’s financial 
market.
24
  
The Directive on Takeover Bids was adopted in 2004 and was requested to be transposed 
to the national laws of the Member States by May 2006.
25
 The core principle of the Directive 
was to promote the creation of a Single European Market and enhancement of 
competitiveness of European companies
26
 through takeovers which were at least in a short-
term dimension seen valuable for the target shareholders.
27
  
 
                                                          
20
 M. Ventoruzzo, op. cit., p 173; A. Zwecker. The EU Takeover Directive: Eight Years Later, Implementation But 
Still No Harmonization Among Member States on Acceptable Takeover Defenses. – Tulane Journal of 
International and Comparative Law, 2012/21 , p 254 
21 C. Clerc, et al, (eds), op. cit., p 148; Martynova/Renneboog, 2011a, p 224, stating that 61% of domestic and 
41% of the cross-border hostile bids in European Union take place in United Kingdom. 
22 The Takeover Bids Directive Assessment Report. European Commission 2012, p 23. - Available: 
http://ec.europa.eu/internal_market/company/docs/takeoverbids/study/study_en.pdf, (13.01.2014) 
23 The City Code on Takeovers and Mergers. London: The Panel of Takeovers 1985 (11th edition 20.05.2013). – 
Available: http://www.thetakeoverpanel.org.uk/wp-content/uploads/2008/11/code.pdf, (20.01.2014) 
24
 B. Clarke. The Takeover Directive: Is a Little Regulation Better Than No Regulation? – European Law Journal, 
2009/15 No 2,  p 176 (B. Clarke 2009a) 
25
 The Takeover Bids Directive Assessment Report. op. cit., p 23  
26 P. Davis, E-P. Schuster, E. van de Walle de Ghelcke. Takeover Directive as a Protectionist Tool? – European 
Corporate Governance Intitute Working paper No 141/2010, p 1. – Available: 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1554616, (12.22.2012) 
27 M. Ventoruzzo, op. cit., p 177 
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1.2. Theoretical grounds for constituting initial objectives 
1.2.1. Prevalent presumption of takeover benignancy 
 
The underlying and prevalent presumption of takeover benignancy lies in the positive 
effects the takeovers as well as hostile takeovers are presupposed to possess – effective 
restructuring of companies businesses, allocation of resources, disciplining self-interested 
management and post takeover synergy gains – and because takeovers have been expected to 
be value-enhancing for the target shareholders.
28
 Based on the latter and taking into account a 
grounding goal of the Directive on Takeover Bids of shareholder primacy facilitation of 
takeovers was set as one of the main objectives of the Directive. For the purpose of 
facilitating takeovers obstacles to takeovers in general including to hostile takeovers had to be 
removed
29
 and strong restrictions on takeover defences that could disrupt a successful 
completion of a control transaction set. A greater number of takeovers in the market have 
been seen as the basis for efficient functioning of the market for corporate control which is 
one of the core aspects of the takeover defences regulation in the Directive on Takeover Bids. 
 
1.2.2. Solving agent – principal conflict30 through defensive measures regulation 
 
A conflict of interests between an agent and a principal is known as agency problem or 
agent-principal conflict.
31
. Agency conflict emerges in three divisions of interrelations of a 
company – the conflict between the managers and the shareholders, between the non-
controlling shareholders and controlling shareholders and between the company itself and its 
contracting parties
32
 such as employees, clients and other stakeholders. The primary reason 
for the conflict to occur lies in the information asymmetry
33
 as the principal does not possess 
the same information as the agent and differences in the position of power between the agents 
                                                          
28
 J.A. McCahery, et al. The Economics of the Proposed European Takeover Directive. – CEPS Reports in Finance 
and Banking, 2003/32, p 38. – Available: http://aei.pitt.edu/9562/, (21.02.2014) 
29 B. Sjåfjell. 2009, p 296 
30
 Agent – principal conflict is widely used term in the legal literature for referring to various conflict of 
interests between different parties inside of a company which in the takeover regulation are partly tried to be 
solved through certain theories. Because of its extensive usage in the literature the concept is also used in the 
current thesis. 
31
 B. Sjåfjell. 2009, p 275 
32
 J. Armour, H. Hansmann, P. Kraakman. Agency Problems and Legal Strategies. in R. Kraakman, et al, (eds). 
The Anatomy of Corporate Law: A Comparative and Functional Approach. New York: Oxford University Press 
2009, p 35-36 
33
 P. Davis, K. Hopt. Control Transactions. in R. Kraakman, et al, (eds). The Anatomy of Corporate Law: A 
Comparative and Functional Approach. New York: Oxford University Press 2009, p 248-249 
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and the principals. The agent possesses a sort of decisive power in the interrelationship with 
the principal to influence the impacts of decisions made on both of the conflicting parties.  
Agency conflict between the managers and shareholders is especially relevant in 
companies with dispersed or semi-dispersed ownership
34
 where the shareholders confront, 
because of their multiplicity, excessive coordination problems
35. To overcome shareholders’ 
coordination problem the decision-making power is delegated to the management.
36
 The latter 
is the basis for the agency conflict to emerge – in the delegated decision-making the managers 
are believed to face significant conflict of interest of saving their jobs rather than maximizing 
shareholder value
37
 and managerial entrenchment allows managers to carry out value-
destroying control transactions.
38
  
Aligning the interests of the managers with those of the principal could be achieved by 
paying executive compensation to the agents
39
 or by monitoring the management which 
would involve herewith excessive monitoring costs.
40
 Both the compensation and monitoring 
costs could be referred to as agency costs which would incur in situations where the interests 
of the agents are not wholly aligned with the interests of the principals.
41
 As the agency 
problem could impede control transactions and set unwanted barriers to takeovers
42
 there is a 
vigorous need for detecting effective measures for solving the agent – principal conflict.  
Differently to dispersed ownerships, in concentrated ownership companies controlling 
shareholders have better potentiality to monitor the management
43
 which is the reason for the 
agency conflict to be more relevant between the controlling and non-controlling shareholders. 
                                                          
34
 C. Clerc et al, (eds), op. cit., p 138; M. Ventoruzzo, op cit, p 186 
35
 M. Martynova, L.D.R. Renneboog. Evidence on the international evolution and convergence of corporate 
governance regulations – Journal of Corporate Finance, 2011b/17 No 5 , p 1533 
36
 J. Armour, H. Hansmann, P. Kraakman. Agency Problems and Legal Strategies. in R. Kraakman, et al, (eds). 
The Anatomy of Corporate Law: A Comparative and Functional Approach. New York: Oxford University Press 
2009, p 35-36; Martynova/Renneboog, 2011b, p 1533 
37
 B. Sjåfjell. The Core of Corporate Governance: Implications of the Takeover Directive for Corporate 
Governance in Europe  - European Business Law Review, 2011/22 No 5, p 647 ; J. Winter, et al. Report of the 
High Level Group of Company Law Experts on Issues Related to Takeover Bids. 10 January 2002, p 21 – 
Available: http://ec.europa.eu/internal_market/company/docs/takeoverbids/2002-01-hlg-report_en.pdf, 
(15.02.2014) 
38
 Masulis/Wang/Xie. op. cit., p 1854 
39
 C. Kulich, et al. Who gets the carrot and who gets the stick? Evidence of gender disparities in executive 
remuneration - Strategic Management Journal, 2011/32 No 3, p 303 
40
 B. Sjåfjell, 2009, p 274; C. Clerc et al, (eds), op. cit., p 138 was stating „/---/ the shareholders cannot ordinarily 
be considered to be fully informed about the post-takeover value as they may not have enough knowledge to 
acquire and process complex information“.  
41
 D. Kershaw. The illusion of importance: reconsidering the UK’s takeover defence prohibition - International & 
comparative law quarterly, 2007/56 No 2, p 301 
42
 B. Clarke. Where was the market for corporat control when we needed it?. – UCD Working Papers in Law No 
23/2009, p 11, (B. Clarke 2009b). – Available: http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1524785, 
(13.01.2014) 
43
 C. Mayer, L. Renneboog, J. Franks. Who Disciplines Management in Poorly Performing Companies? – Journal 
of Financial Intermediation, 2001/10 No 3-4, p 233 
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In such agency issue controlling shareholders possess significant power and advantage in 
comparison with the non-controlling minority shareholders who have no means of possibility 
to participate in running company’s ordinary businesses or influence corporate strategies.  
In the Directive the position is taken that the solution to the agency conflict between 
managers – shareholders lies in the market for corporate control doctrine. The agency conflict 
between controlling and non-controlling shareholders is assumed to be overcome by 
promoting dispersed ownership and one share-one vote principle. The agency conflict 
between the company itself and the contracting parties was not intended to be targeted with 
the defensive measures regulation. 
 
1.2.3. The market for corporate control doctrine 
 
The doctrine of market for corporate control has been defined so that the 
mismanagement of a company could be reflected in its share price due to the company’s poor 
performance and the low share price in turn would provide an opportunity for potential 
bidders to acquire company cheaply and replace the managers.
44
  The premises of the market 
for corporate control lie in the threat of being taken over
45
 or in credible risk of a hostile 
acquisition
46
 which would diminish managerial opportunism, as the managers have an 
incentive to act opportunistically, and reduce agency costs.
47
 As the share price of the 
company is presumed to reflect the value of it and the quality of company’s management48 on 
the rationally acting market the underperforming company shall become attractive to other 
companies who are aimed at attaining control in the underperforming company. Resulting 
from a successful takeover the underperforming management would be replaced. The market 
for corporate control is especially important in companies with dispersed ownership
49
 because 
it should discipline the management from carrying out actions which would otherwise result 
in creating agency conflict. 
                                                          
44 H. Manne. Mergers and the Market for Corporate Control. – Journal Political Economy 1965/110 
45
 P. Lysandrou, P.A. Pra. The Irrelevance of the European Union’s Takeover Directive. – Competition and 
Change, 2010/14 No 3-4, p 209 states that „Investors threat the managers with a takeover by selling their 
shares to a potential bidder.“ 
46
 W.W. Bratton. Private Equity’s Three Lessons for Agency Theory. – European Business Organization Law 
Review, 2008/9 No 4, p 516 
47
 C. Rose. A critical analysis of the „one share – one vote“ controversy. – International Journal of Disclosure 
and Governance, 2008/5 No 2, p 128; J. Armour, H. Hansmann, P. Kraakman. Agency Problems and Legal 
Strategies. in R. Kraakman, et al, (eds). The Anatomy of Corporate Law: A Comparative and Functional 
Approach. New York: Oxford University Press 2009, p 35-36 
48
 B. Sjåfjell. 2009, p 330 
49
Lysandrou/Pra. op. cit., p 205  
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The market for corporate control is assumed to lead to positive effects of resource 
allocation, synergies and most importantly possesses a disciplining effect of managers.
50
 The 
Chicago school economists have claimed that the continuous threat of being taken over in 
hostile acquisitions and the free market for corporate control would discipline the 
management, lead to better performance and increase economic growth.
51
 It has also been 
argued that cross-border market for corporate control would align the interests of managers 
and shareholders
52
 and the constant risk of hostile takeovers prevents managerial self-
dealing.
53
 It has been believed that if the market for corporate control would work in practice 
as it does in theory the takeovers could be valuable and value-enhancing.
54
 Because of the 
prior the market of corporate control should contribute to solving the agency conflict between 
the managers and the shareholders of the company.  
 
1.2.4. Supremacy of dispersed ownership and one share-one vote principle 
 
Takeover benignancy presumption created the ground for establishing another 
underlying doctrine important for promoting takeovers – dispersed ownership and one share-
one vote control structure in companies. In dispersed company structure the control over a 
company is more easily acquirable
55
 as there is no controlling shareholder whose lack of 
interest would frustrate the successful outcome of the bid. Concentrated ownerships are 
prevailing among companies in Continental Europe whereas companies in United Kingdom 
are historically dispersed – the median of largest block-holding in companies of United 
Kingdom was 11.09 % while in Continental Europe the relevant percentage was 47.23 %.
56
 
The latter indicates strong dissimilarity between the ownership structures in United Kingdom 
and Continental Europe and for promoting the takeover market in the latter dispersed 
ownership was stated to be superior over the concentrated ownership. 
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Company’s control structure determines the nature and strength different classes of 
shareholders possess in a company and the impacts the usage of defensive measures could 
entail. Control enhancing mechanisms feature strong superior position for controlling 
shareholders enabling them to block the bid in case there is lack of interest on their behalf. 
Non-controlling shareholders are left without any actual opportunities to put their interests 
into practice. The latter constitutes the agency problem between controlling and non-
controlling shareholders which could be solved by prohibiting control enhancing mechanisms 
and introducing one share-one vote principle. 
 
1.2.5. Shareholder primacy   
 
According to the theory of shareholder primacy, the primary obligation of the board of 
directors is maximizing shareholder value – in case of a takeover the latter implicates to high 
share price during the bid and to superior right of the shareholders to decide on the merits of 
the bid.
57
 The opposing stakeholder-model, mostly uphold in Continental Europe, has taken a 
broader approach where the company is seen as an entity consisting of numerous and diverse 
participants trying to accomplish their purposes
58
 rather than just a tool for the shareholders to 
maximise their own interests.  
The shareholder primacy view applies strongly also to the afore-mentioned principal-
agent theory where the shareholders are defined to be the weak party
59
. This is the reason why 
the interests of the agents should be aligned with the interests of the shareholders which in 
case of takeovers and shareholder primacy model is maximising shareholder value. 
Nonetheless, it is argued that the board of the company has to ensure that all the interests 
inside the company are dealt with fairly and properly
60
. Even where the objective of the board 
is maximising the shareholder value, the board should take into consideration and balance 
other involved interests inside the company. According to the European Commission 
Assessment Report in 2012, the European legislators have taken the basis of the regulation in 
the shareholder primacy view where as a result to the concepts like principal-agent theory and 
alignment of interests the non-frustration rule prevails.
61
 
The European Commission has taken a viewpoint that Anglo-American dispersed 
ownership structure and one share-one vote doctrine is superior over Continental European 
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blockholders
62
 while the promotion of shareholder primacy in the Directive is clearly against 
the historical stakeholder-model common in Continental Europe. It has been left unconsidered 
that promoting the shareholder primacy could have detrimental effects for other parties than 
the shareholders
63
 and could set aside long-term objectives of the company. As the reasoning 
behind the preference of Anglo-American approach to the Continental European model is 
vague, the European legislators have taken relatively great risk by trying to force one system 
on another and have not taken into consideration the theoretical differences and empirical 
studies.  
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2. Board neutrality rule – Article 9  
2.1. Formulation of the board neutrality rule 
The basic board neutrality rule has been stipulated in Article 9 (2) in the Directive by obliging 
the board of the target company to obtain prior authorisation of the general meeting before 
taking any action that may frustrate the bid. 
According to the board neutrality rule the board of the target company is neutralized for 
the time of the offer period in order to prevent them from taking any actions which could 
influence the outcome of the bid. Such a requirement was stipulated based on various 
objectives the rule was aimed at fulfilling. 
  
2.2. Initial objectives of the board neutrality rule  
2.2.1. Unified regulation of the board’s role during the takeover bid 
 
The adoption of the Directive was important for establishing legal certainty and the European 
Community wide clarity and transparency on the takeover bids process.
64
 Because of that 
harmonized legal regulations were essential to be introduced across Europe
65
 so that all the 
Member States would imply similar unified rules regarding the board’s role during the 
takeover bid and the adoption of post-bid defensive measures. Board neutrality rule is 
specifically aimed at forming a unified regulatory framework for the role of the target 
company’s board during the bid in connection with the actions or defensive measures the 
board could undertake to frustrate the bid. 
 
2.2.2. Facilitation of takeovers and the market for corporate control 
 
The most important objective of the board neutrality rule is to facilitate takeovers and through 
that the market for corporate control which in could promote solving the agency conflict and 
reduce agency costs. The board neutrality rule is aimed at making takeovers more easier as it 
is known that defensive measures on behalf of the board could turn a takeover impossible to 
be carried out as well as more money- and time-consuming.
66
 Removing the anti-takeover 
measures that the board might set to fend off hostile bidders would benefit to the outcome of 
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takeovers and enhance the market for corporate control.
67
 As a consequence, the neutral board 
is incapable of fending off hostile takeovers. Therefore, if the tool of market for corporate 
control works in practice as it should in theory, the board-management threatened to lose their 
job in case of a successful takeover concentrates on fulfilling the interests of the shareholders.  
 
2.2.3. Solving agency problem between the managers and the shareholders 
 
The board neutrality rule is aimed at solving the agency problem between the managers and 
shareholders where the board in the defensive measures concept of agency issues should be 
treated as managers
68
. The board and the managers are supposed to act in the interests of the 
shareholders. Nevertheless, according to widely accepted notion the self-interested board is 
believed to be so intensely in conflict with the interests of the shareholders that it is strongly 
believed to affect their independent decision-making ability which in turn would generate 
agency conflict.
69
 Because of the latter, and taking into account that agency conflict is 
especially common in companies with dispersed ownerships, it was the core objective of the 
board neutrality rule „/---/ to discipline the management of dispersed ownership /---/“70 and 
the board neutrality rule was supposed to have strong rational in companies where „ /---/ the 
share capital is dispersed among several shareholders /---/“71.  
The level of dispersed ownership companies in United Kingdom constitutes 
approximately 90% of all the companies.
72
 The relevant records for Continental Europe 
indicate considerable increase of dispersed ownerships during a period from 1996 to 2006 – 
for example in Germany an increase from 26% to 48%, in France from 21% to 37% and in 
Italy from 3% to 22%.
73
 Though statistically the Continental European companies have 
become more dispersed in shareholding they could be still classified as concentrated. Based 
on the previous statistics agency conflict between managers and shareholders has been 
especially relevant in United Kingdom and as the passivity rule stipulated in the United 
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Kingdom City Code
74
 had been ascertained to promote takeover market it was attached as a 
grounding principle to the takeover defences regulation. Board’s passivity requirement was 
relatively unfamiliar in Continental Europe before the adoption of the Directive. 
European legislators have taken strong but rather controversial position in 
disapproving the blockholdings while promoting the dispersed ownership structure, easier 
takeovers and the market for corporate control to solve the agency issues, which are actually 
encouraged by the bid itself.
75
 With that they have absolutely been brushing aside the 
arguments how dispersed ownerships and shareholders’ coordination problems generate 
agency problems themselves that should be in theory solved by the doctrine of market for 
corporate control which has no practical evidence of validity. 
 
2.2.4. Promoting shareholder primacy and their ultimate decision-making power 
 
In addition to the prohibition of the board-managers to undertake any actions that could 
frustrate a bid, the decision-making power as part of a greater shareholder primacy theory 
should be ultimately held by the shareholders of the target company
76
. Though the decision-
making power over the defensive measures could be for some period of time delegated to the 
board-management
77
 so that they could seek for a white knight or try to influence the opinion 
of the shareholders, it is seen „/---/ necessary for the proper functioning of the market for 
corporate control and for facilitation of acquisition of control /---/“78 to leave the decision-
making to the shareholders. Having its roots in the United Kingdom City Code the Directive 
has taken its view towards strict board neutrality rule which would grant the shareholders the 
right to decide whether to accept the offer from the bidder promoting by this the Anglo-
American view of shareholder rather than Continental European stakeholder-model.  
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2.3. Regulatory interpretations of the board neutrality rule  
2.3.1. Diverse interpretation of the board in the board neutrality rule 
 
Diverse interpretation of the board is caused by differences of governing bodies in various 
companies that could be subject to the board neutrality rule. Whereas the two-tier governance 
system consists of the board of directors and the supervisory board the one-tier board system 
(common in United Kingdom but available also in the Netherlands) consists of the board of 
directors, where the directors can be divided into executive directors, who run the company 
on the daily basis, and non-executives, who have the supervising duty over the executives.
79
 
The latter creates multiplicity of subjects potentially falling under the scope of the board 
neutrality clause and generates necessity for unified definition of the board in the meaning of 
the board neutrality rule. 
The Directive gives merely one solid explanatory notice on defining the subject of the 
board neutrality rule – Article 9 (6) states that the supervisory board should be interpreted to 
fall under the scope of the non-frustration clause. More concerns accrue from the term 
“board” having rather vague meaning and creating misconception in interpretations. In 
United Kingdom the term “board” in the board neutrality rule context refers to both 
executives and non-executives – managers and the directors of the board. In Estonia it refers 
to the members of the management and the management board.
80
 In the Netherlands it refers 
simply to the target company
81
 without further explanation. In Germany it refers to the board 
of management
82
 and in France it refers to the board of directors
83
. Based on the previous it 
could be firmly stated that the term “board“ in the Directive on Takeover Bids has no clear 
and unified interpretation among the national laws of the Member States. 
Nevertheless, the board neutrality rule should be aimed to be applied to all the 
directors and managers of the company as well as to the supervisory board. It could be 
reasoned with a fact that all of these governing bodies influence the operations and 
development of the company and because of that affect the benefits the shareholders of the 
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company could have. This rather broad view on the scope of the board neutrality rule is in 
accordance with the objective of solving the agency problem – it has been generally accepted 
that the agent in the latter context should be referred to the managers and the board jointly as 
the members of the board have similar conflicting interests to those the managers have
84
. 
 
2.3.2. Interpretation of restrictions on board’s actions during the takeover bid  
 
The general principle laid down in Article 3 (1) (c) requesting the right for the shareholders to 
decide on the merits of the bid is put in practice in Article 9 (2) by prohibiting the board to 
undertake any frustrating actions and vesting the decisional power to the shareholders. 
According to Articles 9 (2) and 6 (1) the time period when the neutrality rule applies 
and the board is required to obtain prior authorization to its action that could result in 
frustrating the bid should be interpreted to start when the bid is made public and last until the 
results of the bid have been made public or the bid lapses. Shareholder authorization has to be 
granted during the aforementioned active offer period indicating the pre-bid authorization to 
be invalid.
85
 Further to the general rule, specific notion should be given to additional 
possibility for the Member States who wish to require more rigorous board neutrality. The 
latter alludes to situation where the board is aware of the bid to be in the air
86
 but it has not 
been made public yet. Such possibility would leave the board with a chance to carry out 
actions which could frustrate the bid when the bid is finally launched. The term “for the 
purpose“ in the board neutrality rule refers that the authorization could only be granted for the 
purpose of the specific takeover bid launched and for certain measures proposed by the 
board.
87
 The authorization does not apply to hypothetical offers that might occur in the future. 
The shareholders can truly decide on the merits of the bid if they are aware of the conditions 
of the bid
88
 meaning that the authorization can be given only on an informed basis for the bid 
that has been made public. Because of the broad time period during which the authorization is 
required, the lack of possibility to obtain prior mandate and the requirement of supermajority 
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vote for an authorization
89
 it is clearly troublesome for the board to undertake any actions in 
their own interests. 
The board is prohibited of taking any action that could frustrate the bid. It refers to all 
operations which are „/---/ not carried out in the normal course of business and are not in 
conformity with the normal market practices /---/“90 and especially the board neutrality rule is 
aimed at preventing the target board to put in place poison pills or sales of substantial assets
91
.  
Nevertheless, actions of the board that are carried out in part of its normal business activities
92
 
do not fall under the prohibition clause. In such case, if the board of the target company 
succeeds to prove that the operation is and would be carried out part of the normal course of 
business of the target company rather than as a defensive measure it would not be caught by 
the board neutrality rule. However, the possibility for an action to fall within the scope of the 
prior explanation is rather exceptional. 
There are however few possibilities left for the target board to influence the outcome 
of the bid. One of these is stipulated in Article 9 (2) which allows seeking alternative bids. 
According to this, the board is permitted to look for a third contestable bidder or a white 
knight that would create an alternative solution for the shareholders in a hostile bid context 
and would support the enhancement of the price offer as the alternative bidder could be 
willing to pay more.
93
 Seeking a white knight is also known to discourage the first bidder 
from initially launching the bid as the competing bidder would benefit from the free-riding 
and the friendly white knight usually succeeds as the friendly party is willing to pay more due 
to the beneficial potentiality and synergy gains.
94
 However, if a desirable rival bidder has 
been identified the board neutrality applies again
95
 as the Directive only permits the seeking 
for the board but not acting upon it. The latter does not leave the board with a lot of 
opportunities – the board has a chance to inform the shareholders about the consequences and 
characteristics of a hostile bid and the board could also try to persuade the shareholders to 
adopt defensive measures if there are sufficient reasons to believe the bid to have destructive 
effects on the target company. 
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It has been stated that the Member States generally devise rules which could protect 
the incumbent management and the board.
96
 Also shareholders in dispersed ownership 
companies see the delegation of decision-making powers to the board-management as a 
solution to the coordination problems they confront. The delegation of decision-making 
power does not violate in itself particularly the right of the shareholder to decide on the merits 
of the bid as the shareholders have chosen the agents who decide on their behalf themselves. 
It is even acknowledged that the managers make better decisions regarding the company’s 
businesses as they are better informed of the company’s position97 and they are specialised on 
running the daily businesses of the company.  
If the board neutrality rule is applied, it does not leave a lot for the company’s board or 
management to do if they want themselves or consider it to be necessary to frustrate the bid. 
One of the possibilities is to seek for alternative bid which is nonetheless restricted only to the 
seeking part. The most influential tool for frustrating the bid in a situation where the neutrality 
rule applies to the board is the persuasion and giving an opinion on the bid to the shareholders 
over the actual impacts the takeover could involve. 
 
2.3.3. Board’s opportunity to grant its opinion on the bid 
 
Another possibility for the board to influence the outcome of the bid is through giving its 
opinion on the bid. The latter is stipulated in Article 9 (5) granting the board a large scale 
procuration in the strict passivity rule context. Such an empowerment rests upon the expertise 
the board holds in the target company as the board is aware of the company and its business 
affairs the best. The opinion of the board grants valuable information for the shareholders
98
 to 
be sufficiently informed on the effects of the bid when deciding whether to accept or reject it 
and it is the duty of the board of the offeree company to advise them in this respect.
99
 
By fulfilling its obligation to inform the shareholders about the characteristics and 
effects of the bid the board neutrality rule has not imposed total passivity requirement on the 
board of the target company. Though the opinion represented by the board is not binding to 
the shareholders and the board has no real opportunity to follow their opinion in practice
100
 
the board’s opinion performs an important role in persuasion of the shareholders not to accept 
the bid. The reasons for the persuasion vary – the price offered by the bidder undervalues the 
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company, the acquiring company has not taken into account the interests of the employees, 
the future plans for the target company after being taken over are vague or have not been 
communicated by the acquirer leaving the target board and the shareholders without crucial 
information. Empirical studies have constantly found that the opinion of the board is the most 
important variable influencing the outcome of a takeover.
101
 Because of that the board’s 
opinion could work as a frustrating action though not falling under the prohibition clause of 
Article 9 (2). Due to the latter the effectiveness of the board’s opinion should not be 
underestimated.  
Nonetheless, Article 9 (5) lacks some crucial elements which make it incapable to 
function properly in the board neutrality context. For example, there is lack of prerequisite for 
the directors of the board to be independent when giving an opinion or a requirement for the 
directors to shift themselves from giving an opinion if a conflict of interests occurs.
 102
  Lack 
of such prerequisites indicate that the legislators have only come halfway in the neutrality 
requirement as the directors could give false impression in their opinion about the actual 
characteristics of the bid due to their conflict of interests or self-motivation.  
 
2.3.4. Board’s role as a balancing power in the company 
 
The board’s normative role is to balance the interests and powers of various parties inside the 
company
103
 by foremost taking into consideration and promoting the long-term interests of 
the company. The latter should consist of the interests of the stakeholders such as employees, 
shareholders.
104
 It also refers to long-term economic interests of the company such as the 
continuous positive turnover, securing the long-term investments and the revenue derived 
from it as well as sustainable development of company’s strategies. The board’s role as a 
balancing body is effectuated in Article 3 (1) (c) requiring the board to act in the interests of 
the company as a whole. Even so, the implication could have a dual meaning – would it refer 
to the interests of the shareholders or all the stakeholders.  
In respect of these circumstances the views inside Europe regarding the definition of 
what should be interpreted as the company’s interests diverge formidably. From the Anglo-
American legal system point of view company’s interests as a whole indicate the 
shareholders’ interests as a whole but the Continental European approach refers to much 
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wider concept.
105
 There the interests of the company would refer to the interests of all the 
stakeholders. It has been addressed by various studies whether the mandate of the 
management and the board should only consider maximising shareholder value or should they 
protect the firm-specific investments and the long-term value of the company as a whole.
106
 
The conclusion on this behalf is rather unambiguous. As the legislation in overall promotes 
the shareholder value maximization
107
 then the company’s interest in Article 3 (1) (c) in the 
Directive should be in the light of shareholder primacy and the board neutrality interpreted 
narrowly referring only to the interests of the shareholders. Because of that the board 
neutrality rule does not allow the proper balancing of interests of all the stakeholders
108
. 
Based on the prior, the Directive tends to promote firmly the view of shareholder-
model common in United Kingdom, leaving the stakeholder-model prevailing in Continental 
Europe out of consideration. This approach is hard to be understood to represent the values 
and interests of all the Member States as it is rather hindering the general company law 
conceptions of one of the concerned parties.  
 
2.3.5. Takeover defences falling under Article 9 
 
Article 9 is aimed at altering the powers of the board after the bid has been made public to 
undertake any actions that could frustrate it, as the takeovers have been seen beneficial at least 
in the short-term perspective and because facilitation of takeovers is one of the underlying 
objectives of the Directive. It might seem that there is little the board is able to do to fend off 
a hostile bidder. 
First of all, Article 9 (2) allows specifically seeking an alternative bidder or a white 
knight though the rule allows only the seeking and forbids the board to carry on with any 
actions once the alternative bidder has been found. Because of this it cannot be agreed that the 
allowance of seeking alternative bidder is a full defensive measure in terms of a white knight 
concept that the Directive permits. In addition, defensive measures like poison pills, golden 
parachutes or other post-bid defences could be adopted only based on the shareholder’s 
decision
109
 during the offer period. Article 9 (2) implicates explicitly a prohibition to issue 
                                                          
105
 B. Sjåfjell. 2011, p 647 
106
 C. Clerc. et al, (eds), op. cit., p 189; The Takeover Bids Directive Assessment Report. op. cit., p 29 
107
 B. Sjåfjell. 2009, p 405 
108
 C. Clerc. et al, (eds), op. cit., p 173; The Takeover Bids Directive Assessment Report. op. cit., p 347 
109
 Davis/Schuster/Ghelcke, op.cit., p 6 ; Wouters/ Hooghten/Bruyneel, op. cit., p 43 
25 
 
new shares and especially when the new shares are issued to a friendly third party – white 
squire defence.
110
 
The formerly enumerated ordinary defensive measures might not fall under the board 
neutrality requirement, even during the offer period, if they are carried out as a normal course 
of business or satisfies the normal market practice criterion
111
. Nonetheless, there are no 
specific requirements setting out what could be considered as a normal course of practice and 
the use of such strategies have to be analysed on a case-by-case basis. Even though, it is rather 
an exception to classify an ordinary takeover defence under a business strategy.  
One of the tools for the board to affect the outcome of the bid is by advising the 
shareholders as a part of their daily duty and by giving their opinion under the Article 9 (5). 
The advice by the target company’s board is the key factor for the bid to be successful.112 The 
board is also left with a possibility to persuade the shareholders to decide in a certain way 
leaving relatively strong influential tools for the board to affect the outcome of the bid in a 
desired direction. It has also been pointed out that the board could appeal to the national 
competition authority and the board could act in a way that would put a veto to the further 
success of the takeover processes by refusing to show the books and other documents of the 
company to the potential acquirer.
113
  
There are relatively limited possibilities for the board to adopt ordinary defensive 
measures, such as poison pills, pac-man
114
 defence, white squire, golden parachutes
115
 and so 
long, during the offer period, as it is extensively hard to prove them being part of the normal 
business strategy of the company. The sanction for the infringements from the rule is 
determined by the Member State (Article 17). Though there are other eligible measures for the 
target company’s board to influence the bid these measures are not equally efficient, leaving 
the board at least to some extent to the role of a bystander. 
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2.4. The controversial implementation of the board neutrality rule  
2.4.1. Overall implementation of Article 9  
 
According to the recent Commission’s Report 19 Member States have implemented 
the board neutrality rule into their legal system.
116
 From these 19 Member States that applied 
the board neutrality requirement in most of the cases the similar rule already existed in the 
national law and only in few countries it was a new rule
117
 indicating that adopting the rule 
did not have strong influence.
118
 From these countries applying the board neutrality rule 
thirteen have applied the reciprocity exception
119
  - six of which apply mandatory board 
neutrality rule and seven have opted out of the rule but made the reciprocity available for 
companies decided to opt back into the rule voluntarily
120
. 
Nevertheless, the board neutrality rule has not been applied by numerous Member 
States representing mainly countries with the strong stakeholder-model – the Netherlands, 
Belgium, Poland, Germany, Luxemburg, Hungary and Denmark. The latter markets form a 
significant part in the overall European Union capital market presenting vigorous resistance to 
the board neutrality rule. Reciprocity rule according to the Article 12 (3) is applied in all of 
these countries though there has been no case where such a rule has been used in practice.
121
 
In overall the implementation has not achieved the desired harmonization.
122
 Firstly, 
the significance of markets opting out of the rule is substantial. Secondly, there is no 
evidences showing opting into the rule on the reciprocity basis where the Member States has 
not applied the board neutrality. Thirdly, from the opt in Member States several have 
introduced reciprocity who also form a significant part of the overall EU market – i.e. France, 
Spain and Italy. The European Commission has found in its Report that the board neutrality 
rule has been a relative success
123
 alluding to the considerable number of Member States 
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having transposed the board neutrality rule into their national laws on the mandatory basis. 
The latter argument is not quite accurate as there are number of nuances interfering to make 
such straight-forward conclusion. 
 
2.4.2. Implementation in United Kingdom 
 
The basis for adopting the board neutrality rule in the Directive on Takeover Bids was 
the success of the passivity rule in the United Kingdom in preparing a conducive ground for 
an active takeover market. The basic board neutrality rule in the United Kingdom City Code 
on Mergers and Acquisitions is effectuated in Rule 21.1 being identical to Article 9 (2) in the 
Directive which is also the reason why the implementation of the board neutrality rule had no 
impact on the existing defensive measures regulation in the United Kingdom.
124
 
Despite that, the United Kingdom City Code has amended the passivity requirement 
more tighten by obligating the board to give the shareholders who are empowered to decide 
on the merits of the bid sufficient information and advice so that they would be properly 
informed (Rule 23.1). By that it has been clearly stated that the shareholders’ decision upon 
the bid should be done in a properly informed conditions and should not be motivated entirely 
on their own short-term interests of earning quick profit. Sufficient information consists of the 
board’s obligation to issue their opinion on the bid to the shareholders and to obtain additional 
independent advice. 
In the obligation of the board to issue an opinion on the bid the United Kingdom City 
Code has set an additional requirement that if the directors of the board as an adviser to the 
shareholders have a conflict of interest the person concerned should be excluded from stating 
the opinion (Rule 25.2). Additionally, United Kingdom City Code has imposed a strict 
requirement for the directors of the board to obtain independent advice from a third party if it 
is found necessary (Rule 3.1). Regretfully these requirements are not available under the 
defensive measures regulation of the Directive on Takeover Bids. 
In United Kingdom the directors of the board have a fiduciary duty to act in the good 
faith and in the best interests of the company
125
 where the interests of the company refer to the 
interests of the shareholders not to the interests of all the stakeholders. Though United 
Kingdom has historically promoted the shareholder primacy theory it could be that the hostile 
takeover of British company Cadbury by a foreign corporation of Kraft Foods in 2010 
                                                          
124
 Davis/Schuster/Ghelcke, op.cit., p 38  were stating that the BNR score for United Kingdom is the same both 
in pre- and post-Directive. 
125 D. Kershaw, op.cit., p 282-283 ; Section 172(1) of The Companies Act (c 46), London 8.11.2006. - Available: 
http://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/2006/46/contents, (15.02.2014) 
28 
 
influenced their views about strict shareholder primacy as the takeover resulted in the 
amendments of takeover laws in United Kingdom in 2011. Hostile takeover of Cadbury 
indicated clearly that the shareholders concentrated on the offered price only and there was 
nothing the board could do to block the unwanted takeover or protect the interests of other 
stakeholders without breaching their fiduciary duties.
126
 The takeover of nationally important 
company was decided by the shareholders whose purpose of interests were limited to earning 
short-term profit
127
 rather than to contribute to target company’s long-term development. 
The theory of market for corporate control and the shareholder primacy have been 
taken as the basis for the Directive on Takeover Bids having its roots in the Anglo-American 
legal system and in United Kingdom takeover regulation. In theory, aforementioned doctrines 
work efficiently, at least in countries with companies of dispersed ownership and shareholder 
primacy doctrine prevailing. In practice the results indicate that hostile takeovers hit 
companies in United Kingdom at the same rate whether there is good or poor performing by 
the management.
128
 The latter shows that the market for corporate control does not explicitly 
function in practice as it does in theory. If the underlying theories of defensive measures 
regulation in the Directive on Takeover Bids do not work efficiently in practice even in the 
legal environment they were developed it is impossible to argue in favour of them in other 
markets.  
 
2.4.3. Implementation in the Netherlands 
 
Contrary to the United Kingdom and the shareholder model prevailing there legal 
regulation in the Netherlands has concentrated on the stakeholder-model. The Dutch 
Corporate Governance Code
129
 II. 1 stipulates that the management board shall be guided in 
its activities by the interests of the company and takes into consideration the interests of the 
company’s stakeholders. It would mean that the management board and the supervisory board 
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would predicate on a wider perspective taking into account the interests of the shareholders, 
employees as well as other interested parties such as customers and creditors
130
.  
Because of this, it is not striking that the Netherlands has opted out of the board 
neutrality rule based on a possibility provided by Article 12 of the Directive on Takeover 
Bids. Even so, they have made for the companies who apply unprotected corporate regime 
according to Article 2:359b (1-3) Book 2 of the Dutch Civil Code available reciprocity clause 
according to Article 12 of the Takeover Directive and Article 2:359b (4) Book 2 of the Dutch 
Civil Code. There are no significant differences in the formulation of the board neutrality rule 
between the Dutch Civil Code and the Directive on Takeover Bids. As the unprotected 
corporate regime is optional for a corporation, the rule is that the board is not required to be 
neutral once the takeover bid has been made public. Besides the general principal stipulated in 
the legislation there is relatively profound case law in this regard setting out the principles for 
the target board’s role in a case of a takeover.  
The most essential judgment creating the underlying principles of board’s powers to 
adopt defensive measures in case of a hostile takeover was by the Dutch Supreme Court the 
Rodamco North America (RNA) case
131
 where the court introduced the RNA clause. 
According to the RNA clause the directors of the target company may take ad hoc defensive 
measures
132
 if these measures are used temporary, they are proportionate to the threat posed to 
the company and its stakeholders and the aim of the measures adopted is to preserve the status 
quo of the company.
133
 The judgment set out remarkable rules governing the board’s authority 
of Dutch listed companies and the RNA clause is widely used currently as well.  
In addition to the Rodamco North America case, there are few other cases that have 
changed formidably the views on the board’s role in hostile takeovers. In the case of ABN 
AMRO, where the board used the so-called crown jewel defence by selling one of its 
attractive assets, the Supreme Court found that the board of directors does not need an 
approval from the general meeting to carry out such a defence.
134
 The ABN AMRO case from 
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2007 has given cause to a discussion that there has been a revolution in the Dutch company 
law
135
 and that the Dutch corporate law is moving towards the management friendly Delaware 
law
136
. Similar rulings as in ABN AMRO case were done in ASMI International N.V. case in 
2010
137
 and in Stork case 2007
138
. Based on the described cases it can be said that there has 
been developed a strong case law setting the borders within what the target company’s board 
may act
139
 when faced with a hostile takeover. Dutch listed companies are subject to strong 
protective measures available for the board undertake without the authorization from the 
general meeting
140
. Therefore it is not easy to succeed in launching a hostile bid for a Dutch 
company. 
In the latter perspective one special defensive measure widely used by Dutch 
companies is the issuance of protective preference shares to a friendly special-purpose 
foundation when there is a takeover threat.
141
 If such a protective measure is put in place, it 
would dilute the bidder’s voting power and make it more expensive to acquire control over 
the target company.
142
The power to issue such preference shares to a friendly foundation is 
usually vested in the management board.  
Dutch companies can be argued to be well protected against hostile takeovers as they 
have developed significantly effective measures to fend off hostile bidders and such power is 
delegated largely to the board of the target company.
143
 The Netherlands therefore has taken 
absolutely opposite approach regarding the board neutrality than the United Kingdom 
representing the Continental European standpoint of stakeholder protectionism rather than 
shareholder primacy. In addition, the agency conflict between the managers and shareholders 
is not seen as severe as in the United Kingdom and in the Directive on Takeover Bids, 
whereas the managerial usage of defensive measures during the bid is greatly promoted. For a 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
the-Supreme-Court/Pages/Summary-of-the-Courts-ruling-of-13-July-2007-in-ABN-AMRO-cases.aspx, 
(20.02.2014) 
135
 C. de Groot, A. van Nood, F. Lambert. The ABN AMRO ruling: Some Commentaries. – European Company 
Law, 2007/4 No 4 
136 D. Quinn. Dutch Treat: Netherlands Judiciary Only Goes Halfway Towards Adopting Delaware Trilogy in 
Takeover Context. - Vanderbilt Journal of Transnational Law, 2012/41 No 4, p 1211 
137
 Dutch Supreme Court, JOR 2010/228, 9.07.2010. – Available: 
http://uitspraken.rechtspraak.nl/inziendocument?id=ECLI:NL:HR:2010:BM0976, (20.02.2014) 
138
 Dutch Supreme Court, JOR 2007/42, 17.01.2007. - Available: 
http://uitspraken.rechtspraak.nl/inziendocument?id=ECLI:NL:HR:2010:BM0976, (20.02.2014) 
139
 W.J.L. Calkoen, op. cit., p 329 
140 A.M. Pacces. Rethinking Corporate Governance: The Law and Economics of Control Powers. New York: 
Routledge 2012, p 47 
141
 Public takeover bids in the Benelux. Loyens&Loeff N.V. 2011. – Available: http://www.loyensloeff.com/nl-
NL/News/Publications/Books/Documents/Public%20takeover%20bids%20in%20the%20Benelux_X.pdf, p 84, 
(22.03.2014) 
142
 A.M. Pacces, op. cit., p 200 
143 J. Bekkum. et al. Corporate Governance in Netherlands. – Electronic Journal of Comparative Law, 2010/14, p 
23. – Available: http://www.ejcl.org/143/art143-17.pdf (17.01.2014) 
31 
 
conclusion, the implementation of the Directive had no significant impact on the existing 
defensive measures regulation in the Netherlands.
144
 
 
2.4.4. Implementation in Estonia 
 
Estonia has implemented the board neutrality rule but has not made it subject to the 
reciprocity therefore Estonian legislators have demanded strict neutrality from the 
management body (supervisory and management board together) in case the takeover bid has 
been made public (Securities Market Act § 171 (1)). The rule also extends to period before the 
takeover bid has been formally launched (SMA § 171 (4)). Nevertheless, the implementation 
of the Directive has not had any significant effect on Estonian board neutrality regulation.
145
 
The board neutrality clause, stipulated in § 171 (3) of the SMA, allows the target 
company’s shareholders to give an authorization to the board to carry out actions in the 
capacity of protective measures which are prohibited to be applied for a longer period than 
necessary. As the authorization by the general meeting of the shareholders requires at least 
two-thirds of the votes represented at the general meeting to be in favour (SMA § 171 (5)) it 
could be rather troublesome for the management body to persuade such a large scale of 
shareholders to grant the authorization for protective measures. Because of the latter, a 
takeover of an Estonian company could turn out to be relatively simple especially as Estonia 
has not implemented reciprocity clause to the board neutrality and the companies cannot opt 
out when they are subject to a takeover bid by a company not applying such rule itself.  
Hitherto there are no official cases in Estonia stating a hostile takeover bid being launched 
– the reasons for this lie partly in the small financial market of Estonia and the small number 
of companies listed on the NASDAQ OMX Tallinn.
146
 Another reason for the lack of hostile 
takeovers is that as Estonian companies are relatively concentrated and under the control of 
blockholders the acquisitions are generally carried out through friendly negotiations. Because 
of the controlling blockholder the monitoring costs of the managers are marginal in 
comparison with dispersed ownership companies and the opportunistic behaviour of the 
management body is not creating severe agency problems in companies.  
 
 
                                                          
144
 Davis/Schuster/Ghelcke, op.cit., p 38 is stating that the BNR score of Dutch defensive measures regulation is 
the same pre- and post-bid. 
145
 Davis/Schuster/Ghelcke, op.cit., p 38 is stating that the BNR score is the same pre- and post-bid. 
146
 There is currently only 13 companies listed on the NASDAQ OMX Tallinn stock exchange with few more 
companies on a Secondary List of NASDAQ OMX Tallinn.  
32 
 
2.5. The conformity between the initial objectives and the actual impacts of the 
board neutrality rule 
2.5.1. Actual impacts of the board neutrality rule 
 
For the analysis whether the initial objectives set to the board neutrality rule have 
fulfilled their objectives through the regulation and its implementation and thereof are in 
conformity with the actual impacts the rule has created the latter impacts have to be detected. 
The assumptions over the actual impacts and effects the board neutrality rule has had or 
would have vary. These allegations generally concentrate on few effects though the 
conclusions over the impacts should be done in an aggregated whole.  
 
Outcomes on the regulation regarding defensive measures against hostile takeovers:  
 Board neutrality rule has been made available as a rule for all the Member States and 
companies within these states. 
Firstly, the board neutrality rule as part of the Directive has to be implemented into the 
laws of the Member States and is mandatory to be followed for the companies. Corporate 
governance codes, which generally regulated the takeover bids process among other corporate 
law issues, had been normally adopted as standards or recommendations.
147
 The latter is 
denoting that they are not required to be followed on a mandatory basis but should be taken 
rather as a good business practice. Adoption of the Directive on Takeover Bids changed 
previously recommendable restrictions into mandatory rules. 
Secondly, though the board neutrality rule is not entirely mandatory in the Directive but is 
subject to the optionality and reciprocity exceptions then even if the Member State has 
decided to opt out from the board neutrality rule the companies within that Member State 
have left with an opportunity to opt back into the rule on the voluntary basis if found 
necessary. As a result, the board neutrality rule is more widely available both for the Member 
States and for the companies and with that the companies are more open to takeovers than 
before the adoption of the Directive.
148
 
 
 Board neutrality rule has not had as significant impact as expected. 
Firstly, the implementation of the board neutrality rule has been moderate according to 
Figure 3 in the Annex. Though the European Commission has implied that the 
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implementation of the board neutrality rule has been a relative success
149
 such conclusion 
made is inconsiderate. In a more profound observation the results indicate that firstly, the 
regulation has not had significant impact as most of the opt in countries already had similar 
rule in their takeover regulation
150
 and there are a significant number of countries that made 
reciprocity available. Secondly, the rule has been opted out by a particular community of 
Member States that support the stakeholder-model and form a considerably vast part of the 
overall financial market in Europe. Thirdly, though the countries opting out have also made 
available reciprocity there are little evidence of the usage of it. 
In further, the board neutrality rule has not made takeover regulations more bidder-
friendly as was expected. According to the statistics represented on Figure 4 in the Annex 
show that the board neutrality rule has been stayed relatively the same after the adoption of 
the Directive in companies forming 61% of the capital market, in companies forming 37% of 
the capital market the board neutrality rule has developed towards less bidder-friendly and 
only in companies forming 2% of the capital market the board neutrality has changed more 
bidder-friendly. The latter represents the accurate implementation influence as the comparison 
on a number of Member States level would show more positive results.  
 
 Adopted board neutrality rule has loopholes in its regulation.  
The most important loopholes could be pointed out when taking under the consideration 
Article 9 (5) which stipulates the requirement to draw up an opinion. The United Kingdom 
City Code, based on which the Directive adopted the board neutrality rule, has taken an 
approach that the directors of the board giving the opinion or advising the shareholders over 
the merits of the takeover bid should stand down in case they have self-interests in transaction 
but the Directive does not impose the directors to be independent or stand down in case of 
conflicting interests.
151
 The regulation does not require the board to give the shareholders 
sufficient information which could implicate to involving additional independent advice but 
requires only drawing up an opinion of their own. In addition, the definition of the subject to 
the board neutrality rule is legally ambiguous and the role of the board is unclear in various 
Member States. Moreover, the board neutrality rule is argued to be incomplete as it applies to 
actions that are likely to frustrate the bid but leaves out measures creating pro-bid biases such 
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as stock options
152
 where the board itself is favouring a potentially destructive takeover 
transaction.  
 
Outcomes on the board of the target company: 
 Neutralizing board’s ability to act – strong negative impact on the negotiation position of 
the board
153
 and turning the board powerless to act if the takeover is not beneficial. 
Firstly, the board neutrality rule neutralizes the board’s ability to act as an equal negotiator 
in takeovers. A strong negotiation position of the target company could have positive impact 
on the price offered by the bidder and would give the board of the target company a chance 
for better communication to ascertain the actual intentions of the bidder. That in turn would 
have a beneficial effect on the information completenesswhich is communicated to the 
shareholders of the target company. Though in case of a hostile bid, where the offer is done 
directly to the shareholders of the target company by which the negotiation position of the 
board is tried to be circumvented by the potential acquirer already, the target company’s board 
with the board neutrality rule is left with no negotiation position at all. 
Secondly, the board is neutralized to act in a protective manner if the takeover is believed 
not to be beneficial. In general the aim of the takeover would be receiving gains from the 
restructuring and the post-bid synergies the transaction is believed to possess. Nonetheless, in 
certain takeover situations the intentions of the bidder may not be so clear-cut and the fear of 
unknown evolutions in the future may demand for interference from the board. The situation 
is referred to also as a toothless defence since there are no effective mechanisms for the board 
to resist a hostile bid.
154
 In Some Member States, such as the Netherlands, the function of the 
board is believed to be the protection of company’s long-term values and balancing the 
interests of all the stakeholders. If the board neutrality rule would be mandatory, it would 
have severe destructive effects on the Member States like the Netherlands espousing similar 
position. 
 
 Regulation of the board’s role in different Member States is controversial. 
The summary comparison of the implementation of the Directive in United Kingdom, the 
Netherlands and Estonia indicated that the role of the board during the takeover has been 
viewed in different Member States differently even though the aim of the Directive was 
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firmly the neutralization of the board. While the regulation in United Kingdom and Estonia 
required strict board passivity the situation in the Netherlands is opposite and the case law has 
granted comprehensive authorization for the boards of the target companies to adopt 
defensive measures in a case of hostile takeovers. The Netherlands together with other 
stakeholder-model supportive Member States have opted out of the board neutrality rule and 
granted the board of the target company extensive balancing power inside the company.  
 
Outcomes on the companies part of the takeover transaction: 
 Takeovers including hostile takeovers are not beneficial to all companies. 
According to a study target companies in United Kingdom secure significantly higher 
returns from takeovers than their counterparts in Continental Europe
155
 indicating that 
takeovers are more beneficial in the formerly mentioned Member State. Moreover hostile 
takeovers are resisted by the target company, namely the interested parties inside of the 
company such as the shareholders, the management and other stakeholders. It could be also 
resisted by the government and the social community as a whole. The reasons for the 
resistance vary enormously and are unpredictable but because of the resistance a hostile 
takeover of a company has always negative impacts on an entity resisting the bid. As the 
terms of a takeover are not based on a mutual understanding or on a negotiated contract
156
 the 
transaction would have unpredictable effects on the target company or on the economy of the 
Member State where the company is incorporated. Hostile takeovers have been seen 
beneficial in United Kingdom
157
 for serving the underlying theories of solving the agency 
problem between the shareholders and the managers through the market for corporate control. 
In Continental Europe hostile takeovers have been treated with extreme caution as the 
Member States are afraid their companies to be vulnerable to hostile bidders especially 
regarding foreign bidders. 
 
 Directive has made companies more vulnerable. 
Vulnerability results from the board neutrality rule since the board is disabled to actively 
engage in activities that could frustrate the bid and as the authorization from the general 
meeting generally is time-consuming, there might not be efficient tools for fending off a 
hostile bidder if needed. The need to fend of hostile bid could result from various reasons 
besides the theory of managerial self-interest – protecting company because of its importance 
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on national economy, protecting stakeholders’ interests jointly with these of the shareholders, 
protecting the long-term interests of the company itself. The takeover cases from United 
Kingdom and the Netherlands indicated directly that hostile takeovers are unwelcomed in the 
some Member States. This is why the facilitation of them could have destructive impacts on 
national economies. Though, the reciprocity clause available for the target companies to opt 
out the board neutrality if the bidder is not subject to this requirement applicability of the 
option is also for the shareholders to decide and because of this troublesome to apply. 
 
 Hostile takeovers have long-term negative impacts on the target companies.158  
Based on the underlying presumption of takeover benignancy it is assumed that takeovers 
including hostile takeovers are beneficial both for the acquiring and target companies. The 
latter approach has been strongly argued as though takeovers have positive returns in short-
term perspective the studies concentrating on long-term economic impact on companies show 
severe negative indication – concentrating on a six months period after the completion of the 
takeover both cross-border  and domestic bids show negative returns.
159
 Hostile takeovers, 
where the offer is done directly to the shareholders without consultations with the managing 
bodies, the incentives of the bidder could be unclear. The effect of the board neutrality rule is 
that it drives towards the shareholder’s blind-voting and promotes the decision-making on the 
short-term benefits for the shareholders.
 160
 If the decision-making power is solely left to the 
shareholders it could have lasting negative results on the target company and its stakeholders. 
 
 Implementation of the board neutrality rule does not support the competitiveness of 
companies 
Takeover benignancy presumption is undermined also when analysing the 
competitiveness of companies in Member States implementing the Directive. Figure 5 in the 
Annex, indicating the competitiveness of companies in connection with their implementation 
of the Directive, shows that companies in the Netherlands, Belgium and Germany which have 
a low score of implementation are among of the Member States with highest competitiveness 
index. The same result for Estonia with one of the highest implementation scores holds at the 
same time one of the lowest competitiveness indexes. 
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2.5.2. Reasoning behind the outcome results 
 
The reasoning for the failure of the board neutrality rule lie in the controversial 
underlying theories and the initial objectives set to the board neutrality rule based on the 
former. The board neutrality rule was adopted in the Directive based on the passivity rule in 
use in the United Kingdom takeover law and by that the previously mentioned theories and 
objectives were transposed jointly with the rule.  
The problem of the board neutrality rule lie in the fact that these theories and 
objectives are determined to operate effectively in Anglo-American shareholder-model and 
dispersed corporate governance system but not in Continental European stakeholder-model 
and concentrated corporate system. Figure 2 in the Annex indicates the differences between 
Anglo-American (United Kingdom) and Continental European approaches most accurately. 
Anglo-American shareholder-model promotes shareholder primacy and shareholder value 
maximization while in Continental Europe the drive towards shareholder primacy would have 
negative effect as they promote the consideration of interests of all the stakeholders.
161
 In 
Anglo-American dispersed ownership companies the monitoring costs of the management 
would be excessive because of the agency conflict between the managers and the 
shareholders. In turn in Continental European concentrated companies the agency conflict 
between the managers and the shareholders is marginal or non-existent
162
 and the agency 
conflict is rather arising between controlling and non-controlling shareholders
163
.  As a result 
from the previous the role of the board in Continental European stakeholder-model companies 
should be balancing different interests inside the company and because of that takeover 
defences are allowed to a certain extent. In comparison in United Kingdom the board is not 
allowed to adopt defensive measures without the prior authorization from the shareholders 
and the decision-making power is entirely vested to the shareholders. 
When it comes to the underlying theory of market for corporate control then the theory 
is not intended to work in Continental Europe and the fact is that there are vague indications 
in overall for the theory to work in practice. European Commission has stated in its Report in 
2007 that the board neutrality rule holds back the European market for corporate control 
rather than facilitates it.
164
 Moreover, competing bids, allowed under Article 9 (2), tend to 
undervalue the company
165
 which concludes in failure of market for corporate control.  
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Evidence for a clash between the Anglo-American rooted board neutrality rule and 
Continental European balancing role of the board can also be taken from the implementation 
results in the Member States. The board neutrality rule has been opted out by the Continental 
European Member States with strong stakeholder-model such as the Netherlands, Belgium 
and Germany. By adopting the board neutrality rule in the Directive the European legislators 
have been diverted from considering Continental European approach. Instead they have led to 
a blindfolded presumption that the underlying theories and objectives rooted in the Anglo-
American approach are the right solutions for achieving the similar liquid capital market in 
Continental Europe as it is in United Kingdom.  
Because of the severe underlying differences in the conceptions the board neutrality 
rule in its current form seems to be impracticable. For the board neutrality rule to work 
properly in different Member States would presuppose more thorough harmonization of the 
corporate law in overall. 
 
2.5.3. The conformity between the initial objectives and the actual impacts 
 
If the board neutrality rule is implemented to the national laws of a Member State the 
objectives could be achieved to some extent. Based on the current analyse the board neutrality 
rule has had moderate success in fulfilling its objectives. 
The objective to establish unified regulation of the board’s role in case of post-bid 
defensive measures was achieved to the extent that the board neutrality rule was made 
available as a rule in the Directive mandatory to be implemented to the national laws. Also the 
board neutrality rule is available to all the Member States and companies. Even so, the board 
neutrality rule and by this the role of the board does not possess clear legal certainty as there 
are loopholes in the regulation and the impact of the board neutrality rule has not been as 
significant as expected. Moreover, the board neutrality rule has strong negative impact on the 
negotiation position of the board and the board is made powerless to protect the company 
where the takeover is hostile. It could also have severe negative impacts on company’s long-
term values. Additionally, the role of the board differs between Member States representing 
the stakeholder-model and Member States representing the shareholder-model. As the 
Directive has taken the latter as the basis for the defensive measures regulation it could have 
severe negative impacts on companies from stakeholder oriented Member States. 
The objective of facilitating takeovers and the market for corporate control could be 
achieved to some extent in Member States where the board neutrality rule has been 
implemented on the mandatory basis. Nevertheless, the facilitation of takeovers could have 
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several other outcomes not firmly positive. It has been pointed out in the outcome analysis 
that takeovers including hostile takeovers are not beneficial to all companies. Moreover, 
hostile takeovers have long-term negative impacts on target companies. By facilitating 
takeovers the Directive has made companies more vulnerable to hostile takeovers and less 
competitive. 
The objective of solving the agency problem between the managers and shareholders 
could be achieved in companies with dispersed ownership where the agency conflict between 
the former is existing. In companies of concentrated ownership agency problem between the 
managers and the shareholders is not relevant.  
As a conclusion there is some conformity between the initial objectives set to the board 
neutrality rule and the actual impacts the board neutrality rule has or would have if 
implemented. Nevertheless, the board neutrality rule has numerous destructive side-effects 
especially on companies representing the Continental European stakeholder-model. 
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3. Breakthrough rule – Article 11 
3.1. Formulation of the breakthrough rule 
The basic breakthrough rule has been stipulated in Article 11 (2) – (4) in the Directive on 
Takeover Bids. 
Article 11 (2) is intends to break through restrictions imposed on the transfer of securities 
provided in the articles of association. It also applies to restrictions on the transfer of 
securities provided in other contractual agreements – those between the target company and 
its shareholders and between the shareholders themselves. 
Article 11 (3) intends to break through restrictions imposed on the voting rights provided in 
the articles of association. The rule also applies in contractual agreements between the target 
company and its shareholders and between the shareholders themselves. The article also 
applies the one share-one vote principle by requiring multiple-vote securities to carry one vote 
each at the general meeting deciding over the adoption of post-bid defensive measures. 
Article 11 (4) stipulates that if the bidder has attained 75% of securities carrying voting rights, 
the restrictions set out in Articles 11 (2) and (3) apply. The article also requires one share-one 
vote principle at the first general meeting deciding over the amendment of the articles of 
association or removing or appointing directors to the board. 
The breakthrough rule prevents the usage of pre-bid defensive measures set in target 
companies. Such a requirement was stipulated based on various objectives the rule was aimed 
at fulfilling. 
 
3.2. Initial objectives of the breakthrough rule 
3.2.1. Facilitation of takeovers and the market for corporate control 
 
Though the doctrine of market for corporate control is most relevant in case of the 
board neutrality rule analysis it should not be left unnoticed in the breakthrough rule. The 
breakthrough rule is designed to eliminate corporate governance arrangements
166
 with an 
objective to facilitate takeovers. The role of a potential acquirer is to seek and purchase 
underperforming companies with an aim to replace the inefficient board and the managers
167
 - 
with that creating the necessary prerequisites to the market for corporate control
168
. 
                                                          
166 B. Clarke. Takeover Regulation – through the Regulatory Looking Glass. – German Law Journal, 2007/8, No 
4, p 396. – Available: http://www.germanlawjournal.com (22.01.2014) 
167
 B. Sjåfjell. 2009, p 410 
168
 B. Sjåfjell. 2009, p 301 
41 
 
The market for corporate control is most clearly stipulated in Article 11 (4) prohibiting 
the usage of any extraordinary rights of shareholders concerning the appointment or removal 
of the board members if the bidder has acquired certain threshold of shares (75 %) in the 
target company. By that the breakthrough rule aims to regulate the ability of the shareholders 
to appointment or remove the directors and managers of the target company.
169
 Though 
supporting the market for corporate control does not pertain to the main objectives of the 
breakthrough rule, the facilitation of takeovers and the promotion of such course shall in itself 
invest into more efficient market for corporate control. 
 
3.2.2. Supplementing the restrictions set by the board neutrality rule 
 
The board neutrality rule was aimed at affecting the post-bid defensive measures 
which could be undertaken by the board of the target company to fend off an uninvited bid 
presumed to be launched in a hostile manner. Pre-bid defensive measures were initially left 
intact though such division would not support the board neutrality rule to have any particular 
effect. As it was assumed that the adoption of the post-bid defensive measures is limited the 
companies would adapt pre-bid measures
170
 then the regulation of pre-bid defensive measures 
would be most relevant in the context where the board neutrality has been required.
171
 Based 
on the prior the breakthrough rule was established to uphold the board neutrality rule in its 
effectiveness and support the functioning of the rule in the intended manner
172
.  
Further, the supplementing function of the breakthrough rule is best constituted in 
Article 11 (3) providing to break through the pre-bid defences of restrictions on voting rights 
in the general meeting where the usage of post-bid defensive measures are decided upon. In 
concurrence of the board neutrality and breakthrough rule the adoption of post-bid defensive 
measures depends on the equalized decision-making right of all the shareholders. Though 
Article 3 (1) (a) in the Directive regulates the shareholder’s treatment issue it only requires to 
treat the shareholders of the same class equally. Article 11 has taken the equalization principle 
further by requiring that the restrictions on voting rights or other control enhancing 
mechanisms shall not apply when deciding over the post-bid defensive measures adoption. 
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3.2.3. Solving agent – principal conflict  
 
Board neutrality rule was purposed to settle the agency problem between the managers 
and the shareholders of the target company and the breakthrough rule adds another layer to it. 
Facilitating takeovers, applying the one share-one vote principle and breaking through control 
enhancing mechanisms when deciding over the application of post-bid defences (Article 11 
(3)) or over the removal and appointment of the board members (Article 11 (4)) could benefit 
to the reduction of agency costs.
173
 This in turn would support solving the agency problem 
between the managers and the shareholders of the target company. 
Breakthrough rule is primarily targeted at solving another agency problem vital for 
companies with concentrated ownership structure. In the essence of the breakthrough rule are 
controlling shareholders in a company with concentrated ownership holding a position which 
enables them to entrench their position and to fend off unwanted bidders
174
. They are believed 
to act opportunistically in the interests of their own rather than in the interests of all the 
shareholders. By that the non-controlling shareholders are incapable to express their opinion 
on potential bids and the controlling shareholders may use their position to decline a bid 
which they do not find profitable or longed-for themselves. To equalize the positions of non-
controlling and controlling shareholders the one share-one vote principle is introduced
175
 
according to which controlling shareholders cannot use their disproportionate control in the 
ratio to the actual shares they own in the company.  
 
3.2.4. Enabling easier entry for potential acquirers 
 
As the aim of the bidder is acquiring control in the target company it could be 
confronted by pre-bid defensive measures that make the attempt nearly impossible to achieve. 
As the European legislators have seen in takeover facilitation a positive economic and value 
enhancing phenomenon, at least for target shareholders
176
, it has been found that the process 
of acquiring should be made easier for the potential acquirers where pre-bid defensive 
measures are laid down. The breakthrough rule facilitates takeovers of companies where such 
impregnable measures existed and grants entry for a bidder wishing to acquire control where 
                                                          
173
 C. Rose. op cit, p 128 
174
 M. Ventoruzzo. op cit, p 183 
175
 P. Davis, K. Hopt. Control Transactions. in R. Kraakman, et al, (eds). The Anatomy of Corporate Law: A 
Comparative and Functional Approach. New York: Oxford University Press 2009, p 257 
176
 J.A. McCahery, et al., op. cit., p 65 
43 
 
existing control structures of the target company did not.
177
 Easier entry for potential 
acquirers would make companies more attractive as the frustrating measures fending off a 
potential bid are eliminated and would increase the takeover market and takeover’s 
potentiality. The rule is aimed at targeting most vigorously companies with dominant 
blockholders by diluting their power into dispersed ownership where the acquisition of 
control does not depend on the persuasion of the dominant blockholder.
178
 
 
3.2.5. Eliminating control enhancing mechanisms  
 
Attaining control in the target company is the key element in takeover transaction. For 
the easier acquirement of control existing control enhancing mechanisms, creating inequality 
between the ownership and the actual control the shareholders preserve in the company, 
should be eliminated.
179
 Controlling blocks of shareholders and control enhancing 
mechanisms constitute clear structural barriers to takeover in case the controllers are 
unwilling to support a shift of control in the company.
180
 Due to this they work efficiently as 
tools for blocking takeovers. Control enhancing mechanisms possess great importance as they 
exist both in concentrated as well as in dispersed companies and by that could transform even 
dispersedly owned company into a company with concentrated control structures. The 
objective to eliminate control enhancing mechanisms is driven by the ambition to facilitate 
takeovers, dispersed ownership and equality between ownership and control. 
The control enhancing mechanisms indicate to the freedom of contract principle
181
 – 
per contra to one share-one vote doctrine strongly promoted by the Takeover Bids Directive – 
where the control is arranged based on the mutual agreement between the shareholders. The 
argument against control enhancing mechanisms is strongly supported by a recent study 
stating that these mechanisms are widely spread among European companies – in 
Scandinavia, in Continental Europe but even in dispersed ownership companies in the United 
Kingdom.
182
 Figure 8 in the Annex represents the review of the significance of control 
enhancing mechanisms in European Member States. It indicates that the most common 
mechanisms available are pyramid schemes, cross-shareholdings, non-voting preference 
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shares and shareholder agreements. At the same time Figure 10 indicates that despite the 
availability their actual applicability by the companies is slightly lesser.  
Irrespective of the accurate percentage of companies applying the mechanisms, in 
conclusion the situation presents a clear progress towards widespread usage of control 
enhancing mechanisms. According to Figure 9 these mechanisms are common not only in 
countries well-known for their concentrated ownership but also in dispersed ownership 
Member States such as the United Kingdom. For example from analysed thirteen control 
enhancing mechanisms ten are available in both in United Kingdom and the Netherlands at 
the same time there are less than eight mechanisms in Estonia, Germany and number of other 
countries.  
 
3.2.6. Converging ownership structures into dispersed ownerships 
 
European Commission has strongly supported the position that blockholdings and 
concentrated ownerships are inferior to dispersed structure
183
 and the latter has been argued to 
possess positive impact for easier acquirement of control in a takeover transaction.
184
 Because 
of the prior and by taking into account the main objective of the Commission to facilitate 
takeovers it is clear that the ownership structures among European companies should be 
converged into dispersed structures – high concentration of capital constitutes a clear 
structural barrier to takeovers
185
 and the control is not available for a purchase if the controller 
does not agree to the takeover
186
. Blockholders could decline to accept the bid by a reference 
to their own opportunistic interests
187
 with that making it almost impossible to achieve 
successful outcome for the takeovers. 
Ownership concentration is especially relevant in Continental European companies as 
pursuant to a recent study the median of largest blockholding in United Kingdom companies 
is 11.09 % whereas the relevant percentage in Continental Europe amounts as high as 47.23 
%.
188
 To facilitate the market of takeovers, make blockholder control contestable
189
 and 
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support financial liquidity in Europe ownership in companies of Continental Europe have to 
be converged into dispersed
190
.  
Though dispersed ownership possesses a variety of greatly negative effects and 
consequences the European legislators have not considered them to have any relevant impact. 
In turn rather narrow focus has been set on promotion of dispersed ownership and with that 
also on easier acquirement of companies and facilitation the market of takeovers as a whole. 
 
3.2.7. Proportionality between risk-bearing and control  
 
The underlying objective of the breakthrough rule was a proportionate allocation 
between the cash flow rights and control the shareholder holds in the company.
191
 In other 
words share capital having an unlimited right to participate in the profits of the company 
should be in proportion to the risk this capital is carrying.
192
 Proportionality means that if a 
person bears a risk of 1% then he has to own 1% of votes as well.
193
 In the context of the 
breakthrough rule the proportionality is therefore important between the shares and the actual 
control the shareholder holds in the company. 
The disproportionality is usually established by certain control enhancing 
mechanisms
194
 which create an effective tool for blocking takeovers and due to that are in the 
essence of the breakthrough rule’s objectives. The breakthrough rule is aimed at balancing the 
freedom of contract to agree upon certain control restrictions and rights on the one hand and 
on the other hand to take into account the proportionality principle
195
. Because of the latter 
some control enhancing mechanisms are caught under the breakthrough rule while the others 
are not. In addition to restricting the rights of transfer of securities or voting rights the 
principle of one share – one vote has been introduced to specifically alter the disproportional 
ownership-control structure in the company into proportionate and dispersed.  
Balancing the control and ownership has been seen positive. Nevertheless, the 
breakthrough rule removes the shareholder’s right to veto bids they disfavour196 although it is 
at the same time among the objectives of the board neutrality rule. It seems to establish a 
clash of principles where the board neutrality rule promotes the shareholder primacy in 
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decision-making over the merits of the bid and at the same time restricting their control 
enhancing voting rights to decide in the breakthrough rule.  
 
3.3. Regulatory interpretations of the breakthrough rule 
3.3.1.  Breaking through the restrictions on transfer of securities and voting 
rights 
 
Breakthrough rule should supplement the limitations placed on the post-bid defensive 
measures regulation in Article 9 of the Directive by adding another layer constituting 
restrictions also to pre-bid defensive measures
197
. Pre-bid defensive measures are ordinarily 
referred to different control enhancing mechanisms or other restrictions on the transfer of 
securities, on voting rights or on rights regarding the removal and appointment of board 
members in the target company. Article 11 governs all of the prior cases making it relatively 
complex provision.  
Article 11 (2) regulates the restrictions set to the transfer of securities which could be 
provided in the articles of association or in contractual agreements between the shareholders 
or between the shareholders and the target company. Abolishing such restriction for the 
duration of the offer period shall have positive effects for the acquirer by making a purchase 
of shares in the target company easier than when the restrictions would be present. 
Nonetheless, it would alter the ordinary rights of the shareholders agreed upon without 
analysing the actual consequences more profoundly.  
Article 11 (3) supplements the board neutrality rule in Article 9 by adding to the 
restriction of the board to take any frustrating actions and to the shareholders’ decision-
making power a requirement that disproportionate restrictions are not applied in the general 
meeting of the shareholders where post-bid defensive measures are decided upon. The 
provision is aimed at granting all the shareholders of the target company an equal possibility 
to exercise their decision-making power upon the merits of the bid. That in turn should 
contribute to solving the agency problem between the controlling and non-controlling 
shareholders. The latter is especially vital when taking into account the one share-one vote 
principle added to the Article 11 (3) second section.  
The most important provision in the breakthrough rule is stipulated in Article 11 (4) 
stating that after the acquirer has purchased a certain threshold (75%) in the target company 
restrictions referred to in paragraphs (2) or (3) do not apply. With that the acquirer should be 
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able to break through existing control structures of the target company.
198
 The most important 
requirement thus which supplements once again the board neutrality rule in Article 11 (4) 
provides that the shareholders cannot use any extraordinary rights concerning the appointment 
or removal of the board members. As a consequence a new owner, possessing 75% or more of 
the voting shares, is in a position to hold an absolute control in the target company and is able 
to decide over the composition of the board or the management.
199
 
The regulation in Article 11 (4) concerning the replacement of the board and the 
managers strengthens the market for corporate control aimed at achieving by the board 
neutrality rule. It should also contribute to solving the agency problem between the managers 
and shareholders of the target company.  
 
3.3.2. Problematic interpretation of the equitable compensation 
 
Equitable compensation has been stipulated in the Directive Article 11 (5) to recoup 
any loss the shareholders of the target company have been suffered due to the restrictions set 
in Article 11 (2)-(4). The compensation clause derives from the underlying objective of 
shareholder primacy in the Directive according to which the shareholders are entitled to a 
superior right to exercise their decision-making power in all issues arising in the company. In 
specific cases the breakthrough rule nullifies or limits the superior right of the shareholders 
and because of this the equitable compensation has been introduced. Though the equitable 
compensation principle seems to settle the loss of rights of the shareholders a dispute emerges 
in determining the amount of the compensation and the subject liable for the payment.  
The amount has been interpreted to represent fair compensation for the loss of voting 
rights.
200
  In some countries (such as Austria) it has been stipulated that the compensation 
paid to the shareholders has to be equitable and reasonable, in other states (such as Hungary) 
the minimum compensation has to be determined in the articles of association of the offeree 
company and the equitable price could also be determined by the certain supervisory authority 
(in Germany and the Netherlands).
201
 Even if above mentioned calculation is believed to 
function it is incomprehensible based on which grounds such evaluation could be done so it 
could be determined to be fair for shareholders who have lost their supreme right. In addition, 
the proportionality principle should also be taken into consideration when restricting the 
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rights of the shareholders. The restrictions on shareholder’s rights should be proportionate to 
the advantages gained.  
Moreover, based on the regulation it is unclear who is obliged to pay the equitable 
compensation to the shareholders – the acquirer, the target company or any other third party. 
In the former case the requirement to pay the compensation by the acquirer could function as 
barrier to takeovers because the transaction is made more money-consuming to the acquirer. 
Recouping requirement from the target company does not possess any reasonable grounds. 
The interpretation of the person liable for compensating could be defined unambiguously 
unclear and there appears not to be any legal certainty in this behalf. 
 
3.3.3. Takeover defences falling under Article 11 
 
The main incentive for the breakthrough rule was neutralizing control enhancing 
mechanisms in the target company for a certain period of time and promoting dispersed 
ownership structure. Though Article 11 (2) – (4) define a great variety of circumstances where 
breakthrough rule applies not all the control enhancing mechanisms and other arrangements 
which could function as defensive measures are caught by the breakthrough rule.  
Breakthrough rule affects only these control structures which possess multiple classes 
of shares where the number of votes attached to these shares varies.
202
 The most influential 
impact the breakthrough rule shall have is on certain control structures which are commonly 
used among European companies. The best example is dual class shares (A/B shares) that are 
applied in at least 20% of European listed companies with that making it by far the most 
common control mechanism.
 203
 Adding dual class shares to the breaking through regulation 
brought along heavy resistance. The latter is explainable by the economic analysis indicating 
that 14-22% of European companies applying dual-class shares would incur a control loss in 
case of the breakthrough rule and the percentage of potential control loss is even higher.
204
  
Besides the numerous mechanisms caught by the breakthrough rule there are also 
plenty of exceptions to the rule. Firstly, Article 11 (6) excludes such securities where 
restrictions on voting rights are compensated by a specific pecuniary claim
205
 referring to 
certain preference shares
206
 where the shareholders lack of voting rights but are subject to the 
payment of dividends. In addition, by Article 11 (7) are excluded from the breakthrough rule 
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cases where the Member States own shares in the target company or special rights are subject 
to the national law – the former also referred to as golden shares207. As the golden shares are 
not prohibited by the breakthrough rule the Member States are able to effectuate golden 
shares to preserve their interests in company’s decisions208. In recent years the European 
Court of Justice however has declared the golden shares to be illegal in several cases
209
 as it 
allows the Member States to influence company decisions, including fending off foreign 
bidders – constituting a clear barrier to the facilitation of takeovers. Nevertheless, only 2% of 
European largest companies have golden shares
210
.  
Two other control enhancing mechanisms which are not caught under the 
breakthrough rule but have a significant segment of usage by European companies – pyramid 
structure and cross-shareholdings. Pyramid structures are widely spread as according to 
Figures 8, 9 and 10 in the Annex they are allowed in all Member States and are actually used 
in 75% of the Member States with that being the most common control enhancing 
mechanism. Pyramid structures enhance the control of blockholders significantly as their 
power of voting and the amount of shares owned in the company are disproportionate.
211
 As 
the pyramid schemes are not caught under Article 11 and at the same time are allowed in all 
of the Member States it could be opined that pyramid schemes shall be taken as an alternative 
to other control enhancing mechanisms prohibited by the breakthrough rule. According to 
Figures 9 and 10 in the Annex cross-shareholdings allowed by all of the Members States and 
used by 31% of them could also operate as effective anti-takeovers mechanisms if their 
amount is sufficiently significant
212
. 
Finally, in addition to the prior examples an attention should be brought to an 
observation in Article 11 (2)-(4) which do not apply to agreements entered into with third 
parties
213
. Article 11 can break through only those agreements concluded between the 
shareholders themselves or the shareholders and the target company indicating directly that all 
other agreements are not subject to restrictions. 
For a conclusion it is important to notice that the breakthrough rule represents a 
controversial selection of control enhancing mechanisms being caught under Article 11 at the 
same time leaving other mechanisms unbroken. It cannot be argued that the mechanisms 
prohibited by the breakthrough rule would in any circumstance be more destructive than the 
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others. Though when taking into account the initial objectives set to the breakthrough rule the 
shares carrying disproportionate amount of voting rights are under special attention together 
with measures promoting managerial entrenchment. The sanction for the infringements from 
the rule is determined by the Member State (Article 17). 
 
3.4. The controversial implementation of the breakthrough rule  
3.4.1. The overall implementation of Article 11 among Member States 
 
The implementation of the breakthrough rule is in no doubt a failure as only three Member 
States have transposed a mandatory rule into their legal system – Estonia, Latvia and 
Lithuania.
214
 Baltic States constitute only 1 % of listed companies in the European Union
215
 
indicating the absolute marginal influence the rule has accomplished with the adoption of the 
Directive. Breakthrough rule was relatively unknown in European Member States as before 
the adoption of the rule in the Directive there was no such mandatory rule in any of the 
Member States though some of the Member States have rules prohibiting only few pre-bid 
defences.
216
 France has transposed the rule partially other countries have left deciding upon 
the breakthrough rule to the companies with or without reciprocity
217
 - there are no 
indications of any company opting into the rule
218
. Based on the previous it could be claimed 
that the implementation of the breakthrough rule has not been successful granted the number 
of countries making the rule mandatory and the lack of interests by the companies to opt in on 
a voluntary basis.  
 
3.4.2. Implementation in United Kingdom 
 
United Kingdom’s role in forming and influencing the defensive measures regulation in 
the Directive is incontestable – especially in the case of the board neutrality rule but also 
when it comes to breakthrough rule and its objective’s regarding dispersed ownership and one 
share-one vote principle. United Kingdom supported the adoption of the breakthrough rule 
strongly but decided to opt-out of the rule because of the threat opting into rule would have 
imposed on the few of the biggest companies in the United Kingdom.
219
 Companies in the 
United Kingdom have always represented dispersed ownership structures and because of this 
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it is inconvenient to be a controlling shareholder in the company as by exceeding the 10% 
threshold the shareholder would be confronted by a number of requirements.
220
 
Despite the dispersed ownership the availability of different control enhancing 
mechanisms in United Kingdom is remarkable. According to the study most of the control 
enhancing mechanisms are not prohibited in the national law, nonetheless the market practice 
does not particularly encourage the adoption of control enhancing mechanisms.
221
 Even so, 
United Kingdom has opted out of the breakthrough rule and not made it mandatory though the 
companies have been left with an opportunity to apply it on voluntary basis. 
 
3.4.3. Implementation in the Netherlands 
 
The Netherlands, representing the Continental European viewpoint in reference to the 
board neutrality rule, did not change its position towards the takeovers also in implementation 
of the breakthrough rule. The Netherlands did not implement a mandatory breakthrough rule 
to the takeover regulation but made it optional for the companies to opt into the rule under the 
unprotected corporation doctrine stipulated in Dutch Civil Code Article 2:359b. Moreover, 
similarly to the regulation in the Directive of the equal or fair compensation for the loss of 
shareholder’s rights there is no specification to the subject being obliged to decide on the 
grounds of such compensation nor the entity obligated for the payment. With the latter the fair 
compensation requirement lacks actual practical tools to operate effectively and indicates a 
loophole in the law.  
The breakthrough rule did not have a chance of success in the Netherlands because of 
their firm ambition to protect large Dutch companies with a high percentage of control 
enhancing mechanisms at their disposal. According to the statistics represented on Figure 9 in 
the Annex the Netherlands possesses ten control enhancing mechanisms out of thirteen 
analysed with the highest usage of multiple voting rights shares, depository certificates, 
pyramid structures and priority shares. These pre-bid defensive measures in conjunction with 
the preference shares issued to a friendly foundation under the post-bid defences form a 
strong defensive measures packet available to listed companies to fend off bidders and to 
protect economically important companies and their long-run business interests.  
The grounds for allowing such a large scale defensive measures lie in their approach 
towards takeovers and especially hostile takeovers. The activity of hostile takeover market in 
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the Netherlands has been rather active since the adoption of the Directive and Dutch listed 
companies have constantly been attractive to a number of potential acquirers launching bids to 
economically, historically and nationally important companies. The latter has influenced the 
formation of negative approach towards the takeover facilitation objective as the takeovers 
have not been viewed particularly positive in a long-term perspective. Because of this the 
Netherlands represents an antipathetic position mainly favoured by Continental European 
Member States, where concentrated ownership, control enhancing mechanisms and protection 
of large listed companies has been seen preferable. On the contrary the approach supported 
both by the Directive and the United Kingdom dispersed ownership and facilitation of 
takeovers is superior and beneficial in comparison with the former viewpoint.  
 
2.1.1. Implementation in Estonia 
 
Estonia is one of three Member States which has transposed the breakthrough rule into the 
takeover law on a mandatory basis. The breakthrough rule has been regulated in § 1711 in the 
Securities Market Act (SMA) transposing the breakthrough rule as it is stipulated in Article 
11 of the Directive. Nevertheless, the requirement for equal compensation for the loss of 
rights in case the rights of the target shareholders have been broken through has not been 
included to SMA § 1711. SMA § 176 (2) only refers that a target person or any other person 
suffered damage from the takeover bid could demand for compensation without concretizing 
whether the equal compensation for shareholders pertains to that provision.  
The reasoning behind the transposition of Article 11 to the SMA on a mandatory basis is 
vague and ambivalent. Implementation of the breakthrough rule lacked any reasonable 
explanation in the explanatory memorandum.
222
 It stated only that the adoption of Article 11 
would make acquisitions easier and target companies in Estonia more vulnerable to 
takeovers
223
 based on which it could be assumed that the legislators adopted Directive’s initial 
objective to facilitate takeovers.  
Shareholder concentration in Estonian listed as well as other companies is high. More than 
half of the listed companies have a controlling owner of more than 50% of the shares, 
followed by another two companies with shareholder ownership over 40% of the shares.
224
 
The latter statistics is even more concentrated in companies not listed on the stock exchange. 
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Figure 7 in Annex indicates clearly that companies on small capital markets of Estonia and 
Latvia are highly concentrated and with large blockholdings. Though, various control 
enhancing mechanisms are not widely spread among Estonian companies
225
 the concentration 
is so high that takeovers are unlikely to occur. At this juncture, takeover depends entirely on 
blockholder’s decision and the market of takeovers is troublesome to evolve. For the latter 
reason to facilitate takeover activism on Estonian market the breakthrough rule was 
implemented. 
Based on the prior it could be argued that as the market of takeovers in Estonia is very 
small and there are no example cases of hostile takeovers the Estonian legislators have left the 
negative impacts of the defensive measures restrictions unnoticed and concentrated on 
adopting the set regulation in the Directive. However, investors who comprehend that their 
rights could be affected by the breakthrough rule could be less interested in investing into the 
companies and markets where it may occur.
226
 This could implicate that Estonian companies 
might not be as appealing to potential investors as the companies in Member States where the 
breakthrough rule has not been implemented. Even though it is clear that listed companies in 
Estonia are more vulnerable to unwanted bids than in most of the other Member States it is 
rather unlikely the present regulation to change before the practice of hostile takeovers 
evolves on Estonian market. 
 
3.5. The conformity between the initial objectives and the actual impacts of the 
breakthrough rule 
3.5.1. Actual impacts of the breakthrough rule 
 
Breakthrough rule was intended to be adopted jointly with the board neutrality rule to 
establish complete package of restrictions on both post- and pre-bid defensive measures. The 
initial objectives set to the breakthrough rule had to contribute to facilitation of takeovers, 
dispersion of ownership structures and equalizing ownership and control as these were 
expected to involve positive impacts. Actual impacts resulting or possibly resulting from the 
breakthrough rule may not meet the initial objectives set and due that the breakthrough rule 
would not have the effect expected. It is also rather questionable whether these objectives are 
beneficial to all the companies and Member States. 
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 Low implementation score by the Member States because of economic protectionism. 
Low interest towards the adoption of the breakthrough rule among Member States derives 
clearly from the economic protectionism – desire to protect nationally and economically 
important companies from being taken over by foreign hostile bidders.
227
 Even United 
Kingdom, who was one of the main supporters of the breakthrough rule, decided to opt out of 
the rule for the protection of some of its biggest companies.  
 
 Controversy between the objectives for the shareholders in board neutrality and 
breakthrough rule. 
Board neutrality rule was aimed at maximizing shareholder value and vesting the ultimate 
decision-making power over the course of the bid to the shareholders. Moreover, Article 3 (1) 
(a) specifically states that shareholders of the same class have to be treated equally but it does 
not require in itself equal treatment of all the shareholders of target company but only 
between the shareholders of one class. It is doubtful if breaking through the rights of 
controlling shareholders is proportional to the support of the power of non-controlling 
shareholders. Solving agency issue between controlling and non-controlling shareholders was 
one of the objectives of Article 11 and the rule was aimed at diluting controlling stakes into 
more dispersed ownership by which the position of a non-controlling shareholder would be 
more equalized with the controlling shareholder.  
The breakthrough rule seems to go too far with the equalization by contrasting with the 
objectives set to the board neutrality rule
228
 leaving aside proportionality between restrictions 
and the potential benefits gained from them. it also goes ahead from the general principle in 
Article 3 (1) (a) by requiring equal treatment of all the shareholders. Such action is 
inadmissible for the controlling shareholders as their rights would be heavily and inadequately 
affected by the equalization process and it is unclear to what extent the rights of the 
shareholders should be extended if they’re at the same time restricted.  
 
 Dispersed ownership structure lacks of evidence of being more beneficial and superior 
to blockholdings. 
European legislators have taken a strong position in supporting dispersed ownership over 
blockholdings among European companies though concentrated ownerships are more widely 
spread among European Member States. The grounds for the promotion of dispersed 
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ownership derive from the objective to facilitate takeovers and the underlying presumption of 
takeover benignancy as takeovers are expected to appear more often and are easier to be 
carried out specifically in dispersedly owned companies.  
Nevertheless, it has been extensively argued that there are no evidences supporting the 
position of the Directive based on which the blockholder structures are assumed to be bad.
229
 
Moreover, there are indications that in long-term and for stronger shareholder commitment 
concentrated ownership is more beneficial and dispersed ownership is beneficial only in 
short-term.
230
 The latter goes together with the economical evidence from the takeover 
analysis as takeovers have also been seen beneficial only in short-term and having rather 
negative impacts in long-term. In addition, one of the main tools forming a part of the 
breakthrough rule was one share-one vote principle which is natural for dispersed companies 
in United Kingdom but not for blockholding companies in Continental Europe.
231
 
The Directive has concentrated entirely on the short-term benefits without further long-
term impact analysis and imposing dispersed ownership on all the companies of European 
Member States though it might bring along destructive impacts in concentrated companies. 
The underlying problems in the Directive is the narrow focus on few theories and incentives 
while leaving others aside and not taking into account the criticism over negative impacts the 
application of those objectives could lead to.   
 
 There are uncertainties in the breakthrough rule influences. 
According to the analysis of the equitable compensation regulation in the Directive and its 
implementation in the Member States it could be stated that there is lack of legal certainty in 
various factors of it. First of all there are no indications in the Directive of the subject who is 
obliged to pay the equitable compensation to the shareholders. Moreover, it is not analysed 
more thoroughly to what extent the rights of the shareholders could be broken through as the 
proportionality principle has been left without consideration. Resulting from the previous 
there is vast uncertainty
232
 regarding the payment of equitable compensation and the 
proportionality in breaking through the rights of the shareholders. 
 
 Under the breakthrough rule are caught only some control enhancing mechanisms. 
The main concern regarding the application of the breakthrough rule emerged in a dispute 
over the scope of the rule. According to the regulation some of the control enhancing 
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mechanisms are caught under the rule whereas others are not
233
 and the division is not based 
on their destructive characteristics as could be expected. Nonetheless, it has been pointed out 
that the breakthrough rule is not aimed at prohibiting blockholdings altogether but rather 
those where the misalignment between control rights and cash flows exist.
234
 
Breakthrough rule is incomplete as it applies only to some control enhancing 
mechanisms
235
 and therefore goes only halfway in the regulation and fulfilling its objectives. 
Breakthrough does not apply to pyramid structures, cross-shareholdings, golden shares and 
preferred shares but is especially targeted at breaking through dual-class shares widely 
applied in a number of European countries.
236
 Due to that the influence the breakthrough rule 
would have on some European companies is large and destructive while having no impact on 
other companies. The prohibition of some control enhancing mechanisms could lead to the 
usage of mechanisms which are not caught under the rule – for example widely allowed 
pyramid structures which are seen harmful
237
 and effective tools for blocking takeovers. 
In conclusion, it is difficult to explain why the legislators have decided to apply the 
breakthrough rule and the one share-one principle on a selective basis.
238
 The latter division 
which is a problem in itself creates other issues and deviations as well. Therefore, the 
selective targeting of control enhancing mechanisms could bring along negative effects and 
with that more concerns than solutions. 
 
 Companies could apply other measures to avoid restrictions deriving from the rule. 
  Closely connected with the previous impact of selective targeting of defensive 
measures the companies in Member States could because of this and for the reason to avoid 
the breakthrough in a whole adopt different measures.  
Firstly, if the control enhancing mechanisms used in a company are caught under the 
breakthrough rule the company most likely would attempt to find alternative mechanisms to 
preserve the exclusive position of controlling shareholders. It has been widely suggested that 
if the scenario mentioned previously emerges the companies would introduce and recognise 
these mechanisms not being under the scope of the breakthrough rule such as pyramid 
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schemes and cross-shareholdings.
239
 That in turn would make breakthrough rule irrelevant as 
the companies have been left with a chance to use other mechanisms independent from 
Article 11. 
Secondly, it has also been argued that the breakthrough rule making the companies 
more vulnerable to takeovers would influence the companies to incorporate outside of the 
Member States applying restrictions on pre-bid defensive measures.
240
 Unfortunately, 
incorporation outside of the Member State or outside of Europe could impose negative 
impacts on economy and expected returns from the business operations.  
Thirdly, Article 11 (4) promotes practices by Member State companies according to 
which controlling shareholders would increase the shareholdings above the 25%
241
 making 
the requirement non applicable and unachievable in the company. Negative effects resulting 
from such practice is analysed in further. 
 
 Breakthrough rule promotes empire-building and creates lock-in effect. 
Despite the aim of dispersing ownership structures with one share-one vote principle in 
European companies the breakthrough rule could rather drive the results in the opposite 
direction – shareholders would increase their ownership even further as they are afraid of 
losing their position and that could lead to even higher ownership concentration.
242
 Because 
of this, breakthrough rule is capable of altering initial objective into entirely opposite 
direction staying far from what was intended. 
Moreover, the most influential from Article 11 is its subsection (4) which sets a certain 
threshold needed to be acquired for breaking through pre-bid established rights – the bidder 
has to acquire 75%. For circumventing restrictions stipulated in Article 11 (4) shareholders 
who are not interested in an easy takeover and of exiting the company would increase their 
stake in a company over 25%
243
. It would render the possibility for the acquirer to trigger 
Article 11 (4)
244
. If the shareholders are increasing their holdings in a company it will lead 
them to empire building and would lead to higher concentration in the company by facilitating 
lock-in effect
245
. Higher concentration and increasing blockholdings clearly did not represent 
the initial objective of the breakthrough rule and based on the analysis it could be argued that 
breakthrough rule possesses possibilities of opposite effects.  
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 Breakthrough rule would create unequal level playing field. 
Breakthrough rule would facilitate takeovers and neutralize control enhancing 
mechanisms and with that make European companies vulnerable to hostile takeovers 
especially to companies outside of the European Union
246
 or Member States which have not 
implemented the restrictions on defensive measures in their national law. Equal level playing 
field expects the companies to be in a competitive position to protect themselves against 
hostile bids but the results deriving from the breakthrough rule tend to have opposite effect.  
 
 Impacts the breakthrough rule would have on companies differ greatly based on their 
ownership structure and control enhancing mechanisms they possess. 
The breakthrough rule would have diverse impacts on companies in different Member 
States.
247
 It would depend on whether ownership structures are dispersed or concentrated and 
which control enhancing mechanisms are widespread among Member States’ companies. 
According to Figure 4 in the Annex breakthrough has especially strong influence on 
companies with concentrated ownership as well as on companies with control enhancing 
mechanisms. Ownership concentration is higher in companies of Continental Europe and 
Scandinavia while the ownership structure in United Kingdom is dispersed, because of this 
the companies in the former are more heavily affected by the rule and the control loss is more 
serious.
248
 
Breakthrough rule would have the most significant effect on companies with dual-class 
shares which are used by relatively large number of companies and is common type of 
ownership in a large number of European Member States
249
. Though the analyse indicates that 
approximately 14-22% of companies making use of dual-class shares would be faced with 
potential loss
250
 the actual effects have not been so severe as it has not been implemented by 
nearly none of the Member States except Baltic countries.  
 
 Breakthrough rule could have positive impact for potential acquirers if implemented. 
If the breakthrough rule is applied in a Member State or voluntarily by a certain company 
it will contribute to neutralizing pre-bid defensive measures which enjoy strong obstructive 
effect on potential bids. As the companies are more easily acquirable under the rule it should 
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facilitate takeover activity and add greater feasibility to an entry for a bidder and successful 
completion of the takeover transaction. 
 
Figure 3 in the Annex indicates that breakthrough rule has had very high impact 
especially on companies with concentrated ownership which supports the argument that the 
effects of the rule depend on the market structure
251
. Nevertheless, the impact analysis 
indicates that the breakthrough rule has not had any significant impact mainly due to a small 
number of Member States implementing Article 11 and because of this it is difficult to make 
fundamental and unambiguous arguments. Based on the current information the impact could 
be defined as insignificant or even negative on the European market
252
. Even so, certain 
conclusions could be done based on the statistics of implementation, economic indicators and 
also assumption on the effects if the rule would be mandatory in Member States. Studies over 
the latter indicate that breakthrough rule has most likely negative impacts rather than positive 
– the impact could be positive only for acquirers but not for the target company or its 
shareholders.   
Moreover, legislators have done a bold move when setting aside control enhancing 
mechanisms representing the freedom of contract as there are no firm indications over 
positive effects of the one share-one vote principle
253
 and control enhancing mechanisms are 
subject to relatively significant regulation in Member States
254
. 
Apart from the breakthrough rule the ownership structures have been stayed relatively 
same with few exceptions. Though it has been shown in a recent study that dispersion in listed 
companies has risen in Continental European Member States the blockholdings still form a 
strong and firm majority – dispersion has been strong in France (from 21% in 1996 to 37% in 
2006) and Germany (from 26% in 1996 to 48% in 2006)
255
 but in Belgium and the 
Netherlands ownership is still under blockholders’ control256. Companies in United Kingdom 
are historically dispersed.
257
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3.5.2. Reasoning behind the outcome results 
 
As was the case in the board neutrality rule the legislators have taken the same 
superior position in formulating the breakthrough rule where the objectives are driven by 
theories common in Anglo-American legal system with United Kingdom ahead of it in 
Europe without taking into account market practices in Continental Europe. It has been 
strongly assumed by European legislators that because the capital and takeover market in 
United Kingdom is liquid and well-functioning the dispersed ownership should be promoted 
as it is profitable while blockholdings common in Continental Europe are bad
258
. Nonetheless, 
there are no empirical grounds stating the blockholder control to be bad per se
259
. 
Dispersed ownership is seen beneficial for facilitating takeovers, takeovers in turn are 
seen profitable for both the acquiring and acquired company and also for solving agency 
issues and because of the latter promotion of the prior is justified and clearly beneficial. The 
actual situation does not uphold this sequence of thoughts as it rather implicates that takeovers 
are not particularly beneficial, agency problems are different in different ownership structures 
and shareholder’s short-term interests are destructive in overall for the company if not assisted 
by the board’s balancing power. 
In addition to the conflict between Anglo-American and Continental European 
viewpoints the resistance against the breakthrough rule comes from its objective to diminish 
the rights of the shareholders control. It was endurable that the board of the company was 
neutralized under the board neutrality rule at least for some, nonetheless, the companies 
would become especially vulnerable if the rights of the shareholders would be neutralized as 
well. Companies are not in particularly supportive and interested in easy takeover process 
whilst it is hostile and they have not been left with effective blocking tools. Moreover, 
breakthrough rule gives clear indications of Member State’s economic protectionism views as 
they as well as the shareholders of potential target companies are not interested in large listed 
companies with clear national economic importance being acquired by foreign companies 
which could remark the relocation of the company.  
With such controversy and obscurity of scope the breakthrough rule is argued of not 
having a chance of being successful in the first place
260
 and based on the analysis of the initial 
objectives, the underlying theories, its regulation and diverse implementation and the actual 
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impacts the breakthrough rule has had or could have if applied this argument is clearly 
accurate. 
 
3.5.3. The conformity between the initial objectives and the actual impacts  
 
The underlying theory behind the adoption of the objectives has been the view that 
facilitation of takeovers, including hostile takeovers, is good for creating more liquid financial 
and capital market and for both acquired and acquiring companies’ development. Based on 
the facilitation of takeovers are adopted other side-objectives which should support the 
achievement of the initial aim – solving agency theory, enabling easier entry for potential 
acquirers, eliminating mechanisms as tools for blocking takeovers, promotion of dispersed 
ownership and proportionality between risk-bearing and control.  
If the breakthrough rule would be adopted in a Member State the objectives set to the 
rule could most likely be achieved. Nevertheless, as only three Member States have 
implemented the rule it has had rather insignificant impact in overall and there are no clear 
indications whether the breakthrough in the present form is actually capable of fulfilling the 
objectives set to it. Even if the breakthrough rule is able to achieve its objectives the rule 
could have numerous destructive side-effects on European companies and would bring along 
severe economic and legal issues if implemented on a mandatory basis in all of the Member 
States. The latter is also the reason for marginal implementation results. Based on the current 
implementation it could be firmly stated that the regulation on pre-bid defensive measures 
against hostile takeovers has not fulfilled its objectives. 
The analysis of the actual impacts of the breakthrough rule if it is implemented on a 
mandatory basis showed profound negative results (side-effects) for a large part of listed 
companies in Europe. In addition, the breakthrough rule has some regulatory loopholes, it is 
incomplete and some of the objectives set to the rule cannot have beneficial results in all 
Member States as the corporate control structures among Member States vary tremendously. 
One structure does not fit for all the companies and the legislators should be careful before 
establishing these goals without further analysis of their effects on companies in different 
Member States. 
As a conclusion there is lack of conformity between the initial objectives set to the 
breakthrough rule and the actual impacts the breakthrough rule has or would have if 
implemented. Moreover the breakthrough rule has numerous destructive side-effects if 
implemented in the current form and the implementation statistics shows failure of 
application. 
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4. Optionality and reciprocity clause  - Article 12  
4.1. Formulation of the optionality and reciprocity clauses in Article 12 
 
The basic optionality clause has been stipulated in Article 12 (1) – (2) and reciprocity 
clause in Article 12 (3) in the Directive on Takeover Bids. 
The optionality clause in Article 12 (1) and (2) grants the Member States the right not to 
require the restrictions on defensive measures set out in Articles 9 and 11 but the Member 
States have to reserve an option in their national laws for the companies to opt into these 
restrictions voluntarily if they wish. 
The reciprocity clause in Article 12 (3) allows the Member States to exempt the 
companies to apply the restrictions of Articles 9 and 11 from applying them if the bidding 
company does not apply the same rules. 
The optionality and reciprocity clauses regulate the usage of post- and pre-bid defensive 
measures. Such a requirement was stipulated based on various objectives the clauses were 
aimed at fulfilling. 
 
4.2. Initial objectives for including Article 12 
4.2.1. Establishing a level playing field 
The main objective of Article 12 was to ensure a level playing field for all the Member 
States so that no Member State or company would be disadvantaged – Article 12 had to allow 
flexibility for both of them.
261
  
First of all, the level playing field was prevised to be created between different 
Member States. The board neutrality and breakthrough rule adopted in the Directive were 
continually opposed by numerous Member States mainly because of diverse underlying 
theories, corporate governance systems and control structures prevailing in those states. The 
adoption of the Directive depended largely on adding the optionality arrangement which 
allowed the Member States to opt out of either of the rules regarding takeover defences if the 
mandatory implementation of the rule would not be supported. The optionality arrangement 
was aimed at creating at least some consideration in the Member States over their existing 
takeover laws and would contribute to establishing the level playing field between the states. 
Secondly, the level playing field had to be established between companies of different 
Member States for cross-border takeovers.
262
 The objective was expected to be achieved by 
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introducing reciprocity rule which allowed companies applying either Article 9 or 11 or both 
of them to opt out if the company would become a target for another company not applying 
similar rules (Article 12 (3)). The reciprocity clause should grant the companies a chance to 
protect themselves against the bidders not subject to Article 9 or 11 and with that create 
considerable level playing field. 
Thirdly, the most argued level playing field was aimed to be created between 
companies of Member States and companies outside of European Union such as United States 
where the occurrence of hostile takeovers is common and the takeover market active and 
promoted.
263
  
 
4.2.2. Some regulation is better than no regulation 
 
The adoption process of the Directive certified evidently that there were too many 
opposing positions among European Member States and imposition of a unified regulatory 
regime governing defensive measures against hostile takeovers would be difficult to establish. 
One of the potential solutions for preserving the possibility to adopt the board neutrality and 
breakthrough rule as part of the Directive on Takeover Bids was assumed to lie in adding 
Article 12 to the Directive. Though there was firm and relatively high probability that the 
Member States would make use of such optional arrangements extensively some regulation of 
defensive measures was believed to be better than lack of any common regulation. 
 
4.3. Regulatory interpretations of the optionality and reciprocity clause 
4.3.1. The scope of optionality arrangement granted  
 
Because of numerous different factors as shown in the analysis of the board neutrality 
and breakthrough rule the views on their application diverge greatly among Member States. 
As a result the optionality arrangement was added to the hostile takeover defences regulation 
in the Directive. The optionality is divided between two layers complementing each other – 
optionality clause is stipulated in Article 12 (1) with an additional mandatory requirement in 
Article 12 (2) if the Member State decides to apply the first subsection. 
The first layer in the optionality clause grants the option-power to the Member States 
which portrays specific characteristics of corporate control in a certain Member State
264
. 
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According to Article 12 (1) in the Directive the Member States are free to choose whether to 
require companies with a registered office within their territories to apply the board neutrality 
and/or breakthrough rule. Optionality thus applies to both post- and pre-bid defensive 
measures where in the alternative situation their usage would be extensively restricted. Article 
12 (1) in other terms constitutes the first layer by allowing the Member States to implement 
both board neutrality and breakthrough rule (full opt-in), either of the rules (partial opt-out) or 
maintain their national defensive measures regulation by allowing both pre- and post-bid 
defensive measures (full opt-out).
265
 Optionality clause has been relatively popular among 
Member States and has been widely used in case of both rules. 
The second layer has been added in Article 12 (2) by requiring the Member States to 
make it possible for the companies to opt in to the board neutrality and breakthrough rule on a 
voluntary, so called counter-option
266
, basis if the Member States have not made either of the 
rules mandatory.
267
 With that the option-power is vested into the companies. Inside of 
companies the decision-making is vested to the shareholders of the company (Article 12 (2)) 
verifying the shareholder’s right to decide which defensive measures the company should be 
able to apply if the bid is launched. 
The optionality clause leaves Member States enough considerable space to decide 
whether to implement the rules regarding defensive measures regulation or not. On the one 
hand, the optionality clause was the only chance for the legislators to achieve the adoption of 
the Directive in the present constitution. On the other hand, it made the regulation optional 
and by that diluted its intended impact enormously as the Member States were free from 
restrictions to choose their course of action. The optionality clause granted optional 
alternative also for companies in those Member States not applying a mandatory defensive 
measures regulation to opt in. Nonetheless, such course of business would be highly unlikely 
to occur as it would alter the company more vulnerable in reference to hostile takeovers. The 
multiplex system of optionality clause influenced greatly the obscurity of implementation and 
the complicatedness of regulation. Even so, the optionality clause has been the key element in 
defensive measures regulation both in case of the board neutrality but especially in case of the 
breakthrough rule which has been implemented only by three Member States.  
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4.3.2. Reciprocity rule adding more controversy  
 
Reciprocity clause added further complexity to the takeover defences regulation which 
had already been made optional by Article 12 (1) and (2)
268
. It grants the bidder a chance to 
break through structural mechanisms that would otherwise protect the board and the 
management.
269
 Reciprocity rule added the third layer to the defensive measures application 
which in turn could be again divided between the choice of the Member States and of the 
companies.
270
  
In the first part, according to Article 12 (3) the Member States are allowed to decide 
whether to implement reciprocity clause
271
 - to allow companies applying Article 9 (2) and (3) 
and/or Article 11 to opt out of the rules if they become subjects to an offer by the company 
not applying similar rules. If the Member States do not make use of this, the companies have 
no further options and they are in any case subject to restrictions set forth in Articles 9 and 11.  
In the second part of the layer, if the Member State has decided to allow reciprocity, 
the choice over the application of the rules if the company becomes a target for another 
company which is not subject to similar restrictive rules is vested to the shareholders of the 
target company. The target company could opt out of either of the rules if it becomes a target 
for a bidder not applying those rules. According to Article 12 (3) the authorization from the 
shareholders should not be given more than 18 months prior to the bid. Reciprocity is also 
available for companies where the rules are not mandatorily set by the Member State but the 
company itself has opted in to one or both of the rules and if the Member State has allowed 
reciprocity such company is subject to the exception allowed under Article 12 (3).  
Reciprocity (as well as optionality arrangement) clause would grant the companies a 
possibility to maintain and employ their current takeover regulation at least within certain 
scope. Optional arrangements available in Article 12 are difficult to be executed in companies 
with dispersed ownership.
272
 The latter could be reasoned with shareholder’s coordination 
problems. As a result the optional clauses are easily adoptive rather in companies with more 
concentrated ownership structure. In addition, though the reciprocity rule adds more level 
playing field for target companies it changes the regulation scenery more unclear and bedim 
without legal certainty for numerous interested groups.  
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4.4. Controversial usage of Article 12 in Member States 
The optionality clause under Article 12 (1) and (2) could be stated to having been 
successful as the Directive’s adoption depended entirely on adding the exemption to the board 
neutrality and breakthrough rule as they were not acceptable by numerous Member States. 
Nevertheless, the adoption of Article 12 in the Directive on Takeover Bids added diverse 
optionality and reciprocity layers for both Member States and for companies and with that 
turned the implementation scenery into rather complex set of options.  
Optionality provision in Article 12 (1) and (2) has been clearly successful
273
 - in case of a 
board neutrality rule eight Member States have opted out of Article 9
274
 and only three 
countries in breakthrough rule have not used the opt out clause
275
. Though, it is doubtful for 
the companies to use the second layer of optionality clause to opt in to the defensive measures 
regulation voluntarily if the state has not made the rule mandatory as it would change the 
company easily acquirable to hostile bidders. 
Reciprocity exception based on the statistics could also be stated having been relatively 
successful as 13 Member States
276
 have transposed the clause to their national laws as a 
possibility for the companies to protect themselves towards hostile bidders not subject to 
similar restrictive rules. Besides the implementation score the assumptions on the actual 
usability of the reciprocity clause in practice by the companies indicate rather vague results.  
As an example regarding the previously analysed Member States of the United Kingdom, 
the Netherlands and Estonia – the implementation patterns in these Member States indicate 
most profoundly the complexity and diversity the adoption of optionality and reciprocity rule 
have brought along. 
Estonia has opted in to both board neutrality and breakthrough rule and has not applied 
the reciprocity rule by that making the companies in Estonia especially easy to acquire 
through a hostile takeover.
277
 The United Kingdom has opted in to the board neutrality rule 
but out of the breakthrough rule and has similarly to Estonia not applied reciprocity and with 
that applied strict board neutrality restriction on companies’ boards.278 The Netherlands and 
Germany representing the Continental European companies with stakeholder-model have 
opted out both of the board neutrality and breakthrough rule and made the reciprocity rule 
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available.
279
 Based on the former it could be stated that the optionality and reciprocity clauses 
have made the implementation of the board neutrality and breakthrough rule very 
controversial and complex. 
 
4.5. The conformity between the initial objectives and the actual impacts of Article 
12 
4.5.1. Actual impacts and results from the optionality and reciprocity clause 
 
Article 12 in the Directive, though not regulating any underlying theories and objectives, 
is the most controversial provision of the harmonized takeover regulation. On the one hand, it 
was a necessary tool for the legislators initially to enforce the Directive on Takeover Bids and 
to establish unified takeover regulation to some extent among European Member States. On 
the other hand, it neutralized the Articles of board neutrality and breakthrough rule which 
intended to be mandatory and by that removing the effects the rules were intended to possess.  
 
 Made the adoption of the Directive possible and required the Member States to revise 
their defensive measures regulation. 
Before the adoption of the Directive defensive measures against hostile takeovers were 
controversially regulated or there was lack of regulation in this regard. United Kingdom had 
relatively developed takeover regulation in comparison with other Member States but the 
activity on the takeover market
280
 clearly indicated the need for minimum unified 
understandings over defensive measures in all of the European Member States. Moreover, 
Member States where the regulation over defensive measures was minimal or non-existent 
corresponding rules were introduced based on the Directive. If the implementation of 
Directive’s regulation was not imposed to the national takeover regulation on a mandatory 
basis it was at least included as an option because of Article 12 (3). 
 
 Neutralized initially mandatory provisions and interrupted the harmonization process. 
Article 12 clarified the implementation of the underlying Articles 9 and 11 regulating the 
usage of post- and pre-bid defensive measures. Initially the board neutrality and breakthrough 
rule were foreseen to be stipulated in the Directive on a mandatory basis for all the Member 
States. Also both of the rules should have been transposed to the Member State’s national 
legal system jointly to have complete impact and requested effect on takeover activity and on 
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the usage of defensive measures against hostile takeovers. The mandatory restrictions on 
defensive measures ought to have harmonized different national approaches towards 
takeovers
281
 and defences used by the companies to fend off uninvited bidders. 
Attaching optional provision of Article 12 altered greatly the effects the defensive 
measures restrictions initially were intended to have and the harmonizing power of the 
Directive
282
. For the European legislators whose interest were to promote shareholder primacy 
and dispersed ownership, solve director’s agency problems and facilitate takeovers adding 
Article 12 to the defensive measures regulation was certainly an unwelcomed alteration in 
course of developing European takeover regulation. Despite this, optionality and reciprocity 
clauses by altering the harmonized European takeover regulation possessed a highly needed 
solution for preserving uniqueness of takeover regulations and market practices of different 
Member States.
283
 As the analyses of board neutrality and breakthrough rule already indicated 
then due to the controversy between Member States the defences regulation in the Directive 
would have had destructive impacts. Because of this, they would have been unacceptable in 
numerous Member States while in others (such as United Kingdom and apparently Estonia) 
these provisions were awaited.  
 
 Article 12 made the takeover defences regulation more complex. 
Complexity of the defensive measures regulation has been argued to be the main negative 
impact of Article 12. Articles 9 and 11 of the Directive indicated to be more complicated and 
unclear than initially expected. The analysis of the board neutrality and breakthrough rule 
revealed its multiplex and controversial regulation and the actual impacts the rules have in 
different Member States mostly because different market economies, practices and theories 
prevailing in those states. Article 12 without doubt made possible the attachment of Articles 9 
and 11 to the Directive in the first place but at the same time it clearly amended the 
implementation scenery of the rules. The optionality and reciprocity clauses added another 
level of complexity and confusion
284
 to already fairly unclear regulation takeover defences. 
 
 Reciprocity rule in Article 12 (3) created limited level playing field. 
The scope of the reciprocity rule regulated in Article 12 (3) is vague. Firstly, it is unclear 
whether the target company could apply the reciprocity rule also when the bidder is not from 
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another Member State where the application of Articles 9 and 11 should be clear but is from a 
third country outside of the European Union
285
. Besides the level playing field among the 
companies of Member States it was especially important to create one for these takeover 
transactions occurring between companies from United States and Europe as there was fear of 
hostile takeover escalation by United States bidders. Currently it is unclear whether European 
companies are subject to reciprocity rule if a hostile takeover is announced to their company 
by the United States counterpart though it is believed that in such circumstances the 
application of Article 12 (3) should be decided on case-by-case approach.
286
 
Another question arises whether the target company could apply reciprocity rule if there is 
more than one bidder and if some of the bidders apply rules from Articles 9 and 11 and others 
do not.
287
 The target company should be able to opt out of the board neutrality rule against the 
bidder who is not subject to these restrictions itself though against other bidders the target 
company is not allowed to make usage of exception under Article 12 (3). It is unclear how the 
target companies should act in such circumstances and there is little reference for 
explanations. 
 
 Article 12 disables the board neutrality and breakthrough rule to fulfil their objectives. 
Both the board neutrality and breakthrough rule were subjects to several objectives when 
included to the Directive though their fulfilment depended largely on complete 
implementation to Member State’s national takeover laws. Optionality rule diluted the 
possible impact of Article 9 and 11 to a great extent as because of the optionality arrangement 
it was not mandatory for the Member States to adopt the rules and according to the statistics 
Article 12 (1) has been popular in the implementation process of either of the rules
288
. 
Therefore it is clear that the impact the optionality clause has had on board neutrality and 
breakthrough rule is destructive to the fulfilment of their objective.  
Reciprocity rule in Article 12 (3) was aimed at decreasing the opt out effect the optionality 
clause could have by regarding companies a possibility to opt back in to the rules. Reciprocity 
clause, though allowed by numerous Member States, has not had desired outcome as the 
incentives of controlling shareholders are weak or non-existent in restricting their own rights 
of defensive measures and therefore reciprocity is not an efficient tool.
289
 The reciprocity 
arrangement has had opposite effect by increasing management’s power to carry out 
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frustrating actions
290
 and has promoted the prevalence of economic protectionism in case of 
cross-border hostile takeovers
291
. The outcome of Article 12 (3) is that there is little interest 
towards adopting the restrictive provisions of Articles 9 and 11 both by Member States and 
based on the possibility provided by the reciprocity also by companies. 
 
4.5.2. The conformity between the objectives and the actual impacts 
 
Optionality and reciprocity rule certainly have made it possible to adopt the Directive 
in the present form where board neutrality and breakthrough rules are subject to several 
controversial issues creating opposition by many Member States. Because of the latter a full 
and mandatory adoption of Articles 9 and 11 was out of question. Article 12 made it possible 
to harmonize or at least make it available for the companies in Member States to apply the 
defensive measures regulation on a voluntary basis – as a result some regulation was seen 
better than no regulation regarding defensive measures against hostile takeovers.
292
 
Despite the previous Article 12 was rather a necessary compromise than calculated 
and negotiated provision with certain objectives and positive impacts. Though optionality and 
reciprocity clauses do not affect the content of the board neutrality and breakthrough rule the 
implementation of these rules wield great importance on the effects resulting from them. Due 
to the prior Article 12 has had significant impact on the implementation of the board 
neutrality and breakthrough rule and on the effects they have on defensive measures usage in 
hostile takeovers. As a result optionality clause in Article 12 (1) has had harmful impact on 
the level playing field and has undermined the objectives of the takeover defences regulation 
in the Directive.
293
 Though Article 12 has created some level playing field both for the 
Member States and the companies the scope of it is limited. There is also lack of clearance of 
the applicability of optional exceptions in cases of a third country bidder and multiple bidders.  
In conclusion it could be stated that the optionality and reciprocity rules are to some 
extent in conformity with the objectives set to the rules and have been relatively successful 
compromises acceptable for different interest groups inside the European Union. 
Nevertheless, Article 12 has brought along other rather negative impacts. The most substantial 
is the fact that the optionality and reciprocity rules are behind the reasons for the board 
neutrality and breakthrough rule not to achieve the objectives set to them. 
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5. Conclusive arguments and possible changes to the defensive measures regulation 
5.1.Validity of the hypothesis  
 
The hypothesis set to the thesis was following: 
 The initial objectives set to the defensive measures regulation are in conformity with 
the actual outcomes of the regulation. 
Based on the analysis of the defensive measures against hostile takeovers regulation in the 
Directive on Takeover Bids conclusions on the validity of the hypothesis could be declared. 
The conclusion of the board neutrality rule analysis was that there is some conformity 
between the initial objectives set to the board neutrality rule and the actual impacts the board 
neutrality rule has or would have if implemented in the Member State. Nevertheless, the 
board neutrality rule has numerous destructive side-effects especially on companies 
representing the Continental European stakeholder-model and has been opted out by various 
Member States. 
The conclusion of the breakthrough rule analysis was that there is lack of conformity 
between the initial objectives set to the breakthrough rule and the actual impacts the 
breakthrough rule has or would have if implemented. Moreover the breakthrough rule has 
numerous destructive side-effects if implemented in the current form and the implementation 
statistics shows failure of application. 
The conclusion of the optionality and reciprocity clause was that the optionality and 
reciprocity clauses are to some extent in conformity with the objectives set to the rules and 
have been relatively successful compromises acceptable for different interest groups inside 
the European Union. Nevertheless, Article 12 has brought along other rather negative impacts 
such as undermining the fulfilment of objectives set to the board neutrality and breakthrough 
rule. 
As a conclusion it could be asserted that the hypothesis set was invalid. The conformity 
between the initial objectives and the actual outcomes in all three cases – board neutrality 
rule, breakthrough rule and optionality and reciprocity clause – is existent to some extent or 
not existent. The scope of conformity depends greatly on the implementation statistics. 
Moreover in the analysis of all three Articles the regulation and implementation has or would 
have negative or even destructive side-effects.  
By reference to the former the present takeover defences against hostile takeovers 
regulation is clearly unefficient, incomplete and would have destructive influences for 
companies, Member States and overall values.  
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5.2.Reasoning behind the results from the hypothesis 
 
The outcome of the hypothesis analysis was that the initial objectives set to the defensive 
measures regulation are not in conformity with the actual impacts and have numerous 
destructive side-effects. The reasoning behind the results from the hypothesis lies in the 
underlying theories based on which the initial objectives and the defensive measures 
regulation had been established. Namely the underlying theories possess weak evidence of 
effective functioning in practice and their positive effects are empirically difficult to prove. 
The presumption of takeover benignancy is partially invalid. Takeovers tend to have 
positive effect in short-term
294
 and for these shareholders who decided to sell their shares as 
the share price is higher during the offer period than before or after the bid.
295
 Studies 
concentrating on the long-term results show rather inconclusive or negative effects on the 
target company
296
 - especially on the shareholders not selling their shares
297
 and on other 
stakeholders. The effects of a hostile takeover tend to be especially negative in the long-
term
298
 in comparison with those of negotiated deals
299
. Facilitation of takeovers in overall 
would also bring along more hostile takeovers which are certainly destructive and against the 
interests of both the companies and the Member States. The Directive on Takeover Bids has 
not succeeded in promoting value-enhancing takeovers
300
 and the Commission should 
evaluate the actual impacts the rules could have before imposing a mandatory regulation 
based on the Anglo-American corporate theories on all the member States
301
.  
Secondly the market for corporate control is an idealistic theoretical conception rather 
than real-life practical tool as suggested by the Directive. The market for corporate control is 
argued to have disciplining effect on the managers in the target company. Nonetheless, there 
are numerous opinions in dissent to the disciplining effect. Firstly, it is argued that 
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underperforming companies are not particularly those targeted in case of takeovers.
302
 The 
reason of being taken over could rather be the size of a company or fear of becoming a target 
itself.
303
 There is also little evidence of improved performance of companies after a 
takeover
304
 and most empirical studies have failed to prove an efficient disciplinary role of 
takeovers.
305
 Even if there is disciplinary effect, the threat of a hostile takeover does not 
permit the managers to protect company’s long-term incentives.306 The share price of a 
company does not always reflect the actual performance of the managers
307
 as there could be 
numerous other factors influencing the price. The aim behind a hostile takeover could be 
different from the one promoted by the market for corporate control theory
308
 indicating 
clearly the lack of proof regarding the doctrine. 
The roots of shareholder primacy model originate from the Anglo-American 
shareholder-oriented model where the highest objective of the managers is shareholder value 
maximization. In the defensive measures regulation the shareholder primacy theory indicates 
additionally to the shareholder’s right to decide on the course of the bid. The continual battle 
between Anglo-American shareholder-model and Continental European stakeholder-model 
undermines the ability to adopt unified legal approach.
309
 The Directive on Takeover Bids 
focused strictly on the shareholder primacy
310
 without taking into account the Continental 
Europe stakeholder-model and the role of the board. 
In addition, the Directive has taken a position that dispersed ownership is superior to 
concentrated ownership. Even so, it has been indicated that concentrated ownerships are 
beneficial for long-term investment whereas dispersed ownerships inversely are beneficial for 
short-term investments.
311
 Dispersed ownership in connection with the shareholder primacy 
promotes clearly short-termism which does not leave enough possibilities to uphold 
company’s long-term values. 
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Harmonization of defensive measures regulation was one of the underlying ideas 
unfortunately the process has failed
312
 as the Directive has turned the positions of different 
companies more uneven
313
. Though the optionality and reciprocity rules have made the 
defensive measures regulation more flexible
314
 it also created legal uncertainty in various 
factors
315
. The failure of harmonization lies mostly on the controversy of underlying theories 
and the defensive measures regulation established based on that. 
 
5.3.Introducing possible changes to the defensive measures regulation 
 
Preliminary analysis gives firm evidence for the need to bring clear change to the present 
defensive measures regulation and to review the underlying theories and objectives set to the 
regulation. Opinions in reference to the direct recommendations how the Directive defensive 
measures regulation could be changed in a positive direction varies. 
Firstly, based on the previous analysis it could be claimed that amending the Directive 
defensive measures regulation should begin with looking over the underlying theories and 
initial objectives based on which the present defensive measures against hostile takeovers 
regulation was adopted. The analysis of the board neutrality, breakthrough rule and optional 
arrangements indicated that the initial objectives set are not in conformity with the actual 
outcomes of the rules, moreover the rules may bring along severely destructive side-effects. 
As noted previously, circumventing these side-effects could not be done entirely by changing 
the rules but by changing the conceptual framework.
316
  
Most importantly, the differences between Member States and the interests of the 
Member States and the companies should be recognized. There should be found balance 
between the shareholder primacy and protection of stakeholders.
317
 Also, as takeovers indicate 
not to be merely beneficial the interests of the Member States and companies regarding the 
protection of companies against hostile takeovers should be allowed. Concentrated ownership 
should not be taken as negative per se
318
 as the results do not support the assumption. The 
companies should be rather left with a chance to decide their ownership and control structure 
themselves as the breakthrough rule clearly indicates such desire. Solving agency problem 
through the market for corporate control does not implicate to actually function properly in 
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practice. For the solution of the agency conflict between the shareholders and managers 
alternative method should be devised. Agency conflict between the controlling and non-
controlling shareholders could be solved by granting non-controlling shareholders further 
rights for protecting their interests. Diluting the control structure, transforming concentrated 
ownerships into dispersed and disproportionate restrictions of shareholder’s rights through the 
breakthrough rule are not exceptionally positive. Resulting from the previous it has been 
suggested to take a neutral approach towards defensive measures regulation
319
 in a way that it 
would not hamper nor promote takeovers though the current one size fits all approach
320
. For 
that it has been suggested that so-called menu rules could be adopted
321
 which would create 
solution possibilities for all the companies. 
On the regulatory basis there are various suggestions how the board neutrality could be 
regulated. One of the possible solutions debated over is vesting the optionality solely on 
company level after adopting the board neutrality rule on a default basis.
322
 This would put 
the responsibility to persuade shareholders to opt out of the rules on the management of the 
company
323
 or by making mandatory provisions less easily avoidable
324
. Stricter board 
neutrality rule would not likely contribute to solving the side-effects the rule may evoke. 
Despite this, the board neutrality rule could be modified into a weaker form
325
 by adopting a 
joint decision-making power for the shareholders and the managers
326
 or by leaving the 
adoption of the board neutrality rule to each company itself to decide
327
. Additionally, it has 
been suggested to introduce a modified business judgment rule in Europe comparable to the 
business judgment rule in United States where the decisions of the management is measured 
in the spectrum of their fiduciary duties and the rule should apply also to the shareholder.
328
 
In reference to the breakthrough rule and the optionality and reciprocity issues there is not 
many suggestions how their regulation should be amended. Breakthrough rule in the current 
form is definitely unacceptable and before discussing its amendments the underlying theories 
behind the rule should be overlooked. Coming to the optionality arrangements, the optionality 
and reciprocity rules are not the correct solutions for making defensive measures regulation 
acceptable and applicable for all the Member States as is believed in the existing Directive. 
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The regulation of defensive measures should be rather changed on a more concept based. The 
transformation should occur on the board neutrality and breakthrough rule level as the current 
rules are due to their controversial underlying theories, incompleteness and preference of 
Anglo-American views unacceptable in various Member States. Optionality and reciprocity 
clauses are solutions for a short-term period allowing the Member States to maintain their 
existing takeover regulations. Nonetheless, these clauses have frustrated the aim of achieving 
common regulatory framework for the whole European takeover market. 
As a conclusion the controversy of defensive measures regulation in the Directive on 
Takeover Bids is ongoing and the report by the European Commission
329
 did not provide any 
actual solutions to the current situation. Based on the analysis of the thesis it could be strongly 
stated that there is clear need for more deliberated defensive measures against hostile 
takeovers regulation as hostile takeovers have great influence on the Member States and the 
companies.  
It could be recommended to start the amendment of the regulation by overlooking 
different approaches to the defensive measures regulation among European Member States. 
Based on the results of the thesis it is clear that the views of the Member States regarding how 
defensive measures should be regulated diverged greatly. In addition, Member States had 
diverse views concerning the impacts the defensive measures regulation could have – some 
Member States supported the facilitation of all takeovers while others saw the need of 
protecting national companies. Amendments to the regulation could be done after a thorough 
analysis of different viewpoints where the changes would take into account these views. 
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CONCLUSION 
  
Articles 9, 11 and 12 in the Directive on Takeover Bids were aimed at creating a 
unified legal framework for defensive measures against hostile takeovers regulation in all 
European Member States. The European legislators took numerous legal and economic 
theories for granted to establish the defensive measures regulation – takeover benignancy, 
solving agent – principal conflict, the market for corporate control doctrine, supremacy of 
dispersed ownership, one share-one vote principle and shareholder primacy. Based on the 
aforementioned underlying theories the initial objectives to Articles 9, 11 and 12 were 
established. The initial objectives were ambitious and they were presumed to be achieved 
through the adopted regulation. The hypothesis set to the Directive on Takeover Bids was – 
the initial objectives set to the defensive measures regulation are in conformity with the actual 
outcomes of the regulation. Through analysing the objectives set to Articles 9, 11 and 12, 
their regulation and the implementation conclusions and the validity of the hypothesis could 
be presented. 
 
Article 9 stipulated the board neutrality rule which regulated the actions of the target 
company’s board during the (hostile) bid period. It prohibited the board to put in use any 
defensive measures or conduct any actions which would result in frustrating the bid. The 
objectives set to the board neutrality rule were – unified regulation of board’s role, facilitation 
of takeovers and the market for corporate control, solving agency problem between the 
managers and the shareholders, promoting shareholder primacy and their ultimate decision-
making power. Based on the analysis of the current board neutrality regulation and the 
implementation of the rule in Member States the conclusions regarding the hypothesis could 
be done. The analysis indicated that there is some conformity between the initial objectives 
set to the board neutrality rule and the actual impacts. Nevertheless, the board neutrality rule 
would also have numerous destructive side-effects especially on companies in Continental 
Europe. The reasoning indicated that the failure of the board neutrality rule to fulfil the 
objectives set to it lie in the controversial underlying theories and the board neutrality rule 
itself. Both of them represent the viewpoint of the shareholder-model prevalent in United 
Kingdom and Anglo-American legal system while not taking into account the views of 
Continental Europe and the stake-holder model. 
 
Article 11 stipulated the breakthrough rule which was aimed at breaking through the 
pre-bid defensive measures the companies could implement to make the company almost 
78 
 
impossible to acquire or at least more money and time consuming. The breakthrough rule was 
a subject to several objectives formulated based on the underlying theories – facilitation of 
takeovers and the market for corporate control, supplementing the restrictions set by the board 
neutrality rule, solving agency conflicts between the managers and the shareholders and 
between controlling and non-controlling shareholders, enabling easier entry for potential 
acquirers, eliminating control enhancing mechanisms, converging ownership structures into 
dispersed ownership and creating proportionality between risk-bearing and control. According 
to the analysis of the breakthrough rule regulation and implementation the conclusions over 
the hypothesis could be done. The analysis indicated that there is lack of conformity between 
the initial objectives set to the breakthrough rule and the actual impacts the breakthrough rule 
has or would have if implemented. In addition, the breakthrough rule would have numerous 
destructive and negative side-effects if implemented in a Member State. The reasoning behind 
the breakthrough rule to fail lies similarly to the board neutrality rule in the controversial 
underlying theories and the breakthrough rule itself as it promotes the Anglo-American 
viewpoint while setting aside the Continental European position. Moreover, by targeting the 
rights of the shareholders and making the companies especially vulnerable – as in addition to 
neutralizing the board the shareholders of the target company are neutralized as well – the rule 
had no chance of being successful.  
 
Article 12 regulates the usage of Articles 9 and 11 by that making the regulation even 
more complex. Article 12 (1) and (2) regulates the optionality clause based on which the 
Member States are free to choose whether to implement the rules stipulated in Articles 9 and 
11 mandatorily or if not the Member States are obligated to make these rules at least available 
for the companies. Article 12 (3) regulates the reciprocity clause which allows the companies, 
if allowed by the certain Member State, to opt out of the applied rules if they become a target 
for a bidder not applying these rules. The objectives set to the optionality and reciprocity 
clauses were establishing a level playing field and to accomplish the adoption of defensive 
measures regulation as part of the Directive. According to the analysis of the optionality and 
reciprocity clauses regulation and implementation as well as taking into consideration the 
influence the rule has had on the board neutrality and breakthrough rule the conclusions over 
the hypothesis could be done. The analysis indicated that the optionality and reciprocity rules 
are to some extent in conformity with the objectives set to the rules and have been necessary 
compromises for adopting the Articles 9 and 11 in the current form. Nevertheless, the 
optionality and reciprocity rules have undermined the objectives and implementation of the 
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board neutrality and breakthrough rule and have supported the creation of the level playing 
field only to some extent.  
Based on the conclusions made on Articles 9, 11 and 12 it could be stated that the 
hypothesis set to the thesis was invalid. The existence of the conformity between the initial 
objectives and the actual impacts of Articles 9, 11 and 12 is present only to some extent or not 
present at all. The reasoning behind such outcome results on the hypothesis lies in the 
controversial underlying theories which tend to promote the Anglo-American shareholder-
model or tend to be invalid and not having sufficient evidence to operate conjointly. 
 Based on the latter conclusions there is a clear need for a change in the present 
takeover defences regulation. Though there are some suggestions regarding the regulation of 
the board neutrality rule in Article 9 there is lack of any credible proposals to the regulations 
of Article 11 and 12. As a conclusion it could be stated that amendments of the present 
Articles of the Directive would not be sufficient as the problem of the Articles does not lie 
only in their formulation in the Directive or in the initial objectives and the actual impacts. 
The problem is rather in the underlying theories based on which the takeover defences 
regulation was established. The most important transformation needed is the one in the 
viewpoint supported by the Directive. The analysis indicated firmly that the Directive has 
promoted the theories prevailing in the United Kingdom and Anglo-American legal system 
while leaving other viewpoints common in Continental Europe unnoticed.  
 The European Commission’s viewpoint in the Assessment Report published in 2012 
was in regarding the defensive measures against hostile takeovers regulation in the Directive 
uncommonly disinterested in amending the present regulation. Moreover, though there was 
placed some attention on the failure of the present regulation, there was little consideration 
bestowed upon the controversy of the underlying theories as these theories have been seen 
impeccable and improper. Nevertheless, the regulation of defensive measures against hostile 
takeovers in the present form is irrelevant and there is a need for a change. In this regard an 
alteration has to start from the understandings over the underlying theories and their invalidity 
and the necessity of taking into account the position of the Continental Europe. 
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RESÜMEE 
 
Ülevõtmispakkumiste direktiivis vaenulike ülevõtmiste kaitsemehhanismide 
regulatsioonile seatud esialgsete eesmärkide vastavus tegelikele tulemustele. 
 
Euroopa ülevõtmispakkumiste direktiivi Artiklid 9, 11 ja 12 reguleerivad 
ülevõtmispakkumise eelsete ja järgsete kaitsemehhanismide kasutamist vaenulike 
ülevõtmispakkumiste korral.  
Ülevõtmispakkumiste eesmärgiks on pakkuja soov omandada kontroll sihtemitendis, 
mis on saavutatav piisava osalushulga omandamisel. Sellest tulenevalt on ülevõtmispakkuja 
positsioonil, mis võimaldab tal teostada kontrolli sihtemitendi juhtimisorganite tegevuse ning 
äriliste otsuste üle. Vaenulik ülevõtmine on ülevõtmispakkumine, mis tehakse otse 
sihtemitendi aktsionäridele, vältides seega ettevõtte ülevõtmistehingu läbiviimist sihtetmitendi 
juhtimisorganitega läbirääkimiste tulemusel saavutatud kokkuleppe alusel. 
Ülevõtmispakkumise vaenulikkus tuleneb vastuseisust ülevõtmistehingule sihtemitendi 
juhtorganite, töötajate, aktsionäride või teiste ettevõtte huvigruppide poolt või liikmesriigi 
poolt, kus sihtemitendi aktsiad on noteeritud. Põhjused, miks eelnevalt mainitud huvigrupid 
on ülevõtmispakkumise vastu, seisnevad erinevate huvigruppide mitmekesisuses ning 
ülevõtmispakkumisest tulenevatest mõjudest nende huvidele. Samuti võivad vastuseisu 
põhjused seisneda muudes negatiivsetes asjaoludes või mõjudes, mida ülevõtmistehingu 
läbiviimine evib – ülevõtmistehingu protessi informatsiooniline asümmeetria, 
ülevõtmispakkuja potentsiaalne kuritahtlik eesmärk või sihtemitendi ning liikmesriigi soov 
säilitada sihtettevõtte ühtsus ja pikaajaline areng. Samuti osutavad mitmed uuringud 
ettevõtete omandamisel ülevõtmispakkumiste, eriti vaenulike ülevõtmispakkumiste korral 
selle negatiivsetele mõjudele pikaajalises perspektiivis. Tulenevalt eelnevast soovivad teatud 
huvigrupid – äriühingute kontrolli turu (market for corporate control) teooria kohaselt 
eelkõige sihtettevõtte juhtorganid – oma huvide kaitseks rakendada kaitsemehhanisme, mis 
muudaksid ettevõtte ülemineku nii ajaliselt kui rahaliselt kulukamaks ning seetõttu 
potentsiaalsele ülevõtmispakkujale ebasoovitavaks.  
Tulenevalt kaitsemehhanismide regulatsioonile seatud eesmärkidest, Artiklite 9, 11 ja 
12 regulatsioonist ning erinevatest õiguslikest ja majanduslikest uurimutest võib väita, et 
Euroopa ülevõtmispakkumiste direktiivi kaitsemehhanismide regulatsioon on vaidlust tekitav. 
Nimelt on ebamäärane, kas kaitsemehhanismide regulatsioonile seatud eesmärgid on 
vastavuses regulatsiooni ja selle rakendamise reaalsete mõjudega. Juhul kui ei ole, siis millisel 
81 
 
viisil peaks kaitsemehhanismid vaenulike ülevõtmiste suhtes olema Euroopa Liidu tasandil 
reguleeritud.  
Sellest tulenevalt on magistritöö eesmärgiks analüüsida, kas Artiklitele 9, 11 ja 12 
seatud esialgsed eesmärgid on vastavuses reaalsete mõjude ja tagajärgedega tulenevalt 
kaitsemehhanismide regulatsiooni õiguslikust tõlgendamisest ja kaitsemehhanismide 
rakendamise analüüsist. Vastavalt eesmärgile on magistritööle seatud järgnev hüpotees:  
 Vaenulike ülevõtmiste vastastele kaitsemehhanismidele seatud eesmärgid on 
vastavuses regulatsiooni tegelike tulemustega. 
 
Magistritöö keskendub ennekõike kaitsemehhanismide regulatsiooni analüüsile 
ülevõtmispakkumiste direktiivis. Töös viidatud liikmesriikide kaitsemehhanismide 
regulatsiooni seadusrakendused on lisatud võrdluse ning regulatsiooni mõjude põhjaliku 
analüüsi eesmärgil. Tuginedes Artiklite 9, 11 ja 12 analüüsile on magistritöö kokkuvõtvas 
faasis tehtud ettepanekud kaitsemehhanismide regulatsiooni võimalikeks muudatusteks. 
 
Ülevõtmispakkumiste direktiivi Artiklis 9 sätestatud sihtettevõtte juhtorganite 
neutraalsuskohustus (board neutrality rule) reguleerib sihtemitendi juhtorganite tegevust 
alates sihtemitendi suhtes ülevõtmispakkumise tegemisest. Nimelt on sihtemitendi 
juhtorganitel võimalus teha otsuseid või tegevusi, mis võivad mõjutada ülevõtmispakkumise 
õnnestumist ja on väljaspool ettevõtte igapäevast majandustegevust – võtta kasutusele 
ülevõtmispakkumise suhtes kaitsemehhanismid. Seega reguleerib Artikkel 9 
ülevõtmispakkumise järgsete (post-bid) kaitsemehhanismide rakendamist.  
Vastavalt Artikkel 9 regulatsioonile on piiratud sihtemitendi juhtorganite võimalusi ja 
õigusi kohaldada ülevõtmispakkumise järgseid kaitsemehhanisme, mille kasutusele võtmine 
võib tuleneda nii eesmärgist kaitsta ettevõtet vaenuliku ülevõtmispakkuja vastu kui kaitsta 
oma isiklikke huvisid. Agendiprobleemi (agency problem) kohaselt eksisteerib 
ülevõtmispakkumise tehingu korral sihtemitendi juhtorganite ja aktsionäride vahel huvide 
konflikt. Selle kohaselt on aktsionäride huvi ülevõtmispakkumise tehingust kasu saamine ning 
sihtemitendi juhtorganitel soov säilitada oma positsioon ka ülevõtmispakkumise järgselt. 
Viimane on selgitatav äriühingute kontrolli turu (market for corporate control) teooria 
kontekstis. Teooria alusel on ülevõtmispakkumised ja eriti vaenulikud ülevõtmispakkumised 
suunatud ennekõike ettevõtetele, kus juhtorganite tegevuse tõttu on ettevõtte aktsiate väärtus 
langenud. Sellisel juhul on ettevõtte omandaja eesmärgiks sihtemitendi juhtorganite 
asendamine pärast ülevõtmispakkumise õnnestumist.  
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Artiklis 9 sisalduvale juhtorganite neutraalsuskohustusele (board neutrality rule) olid 
seatud eesmärgid, mille täitmine sooviti saavutada ülevõtmispakkumiste direktiivis sätestatud 
regulatsiooniga. Esiteks, oli Artikkel 9 eesmärgiks sihtemitendi juhtorganite kohustuste ühtse 
regulatsioon loomine pakkumise järgsete kaitsemehhanismide kasutamisesks. Teiseks, oli 
Artikkel 9 eesmärgiks ülevõtmispakkumistehingute ja äriühingute kontrolli turu 
hõlbustamine. Eelnev eesmärk tuleneb asjaolust, et ülevõtmispakkumisi (ka vaenulikke 
ülevõtmispakkumisi) on nähtud positiivsena ennekõike seetõttu, et on kasulikud sihtemitendi 
aktsionäridele ning ülevõtmispakkumised aitavad kaasa äriühingute kontrolli turu arengule. 
Kolmandaks, oli Artikkel 9 eesmärgiks agendiprobleemi lahendamine ettevõtte juhtkonna ja 
aktsionäride vahel vastavalt äriühingute kontrolli turu teooria toimisele praktikas. Neljandaks, 
oli Artikkel 9 eesmärk aktsionäride ülimuslikkuse (shareholder primacy) printsiip ja lõpliku 
otsustuse tegemise õiguse edendamine. Viimast võib nimetada juhtorganite 
neutraalsuskohustuse kõige tähtsamaks eesmärgiks. Seda seetõttu, et sihtemitendi 
aktsionäridele otsustuse tegemise õiguse andmine ülevõtmispakkumiste korral ning 
aktsionäride huvide kaitse ülimuslikkus on positiivsed aktsionäride huvide kaitse mudeli 
(shareholder-model) kohaselt. Aktsionäride huvide mudel on võetud kaitsemehhanismide 
regulatsiooni aluseks. 
Sihtettevõtte juhtorganite neutraalsuskohustuse regulatsiooni tõlgendamisel on 
tekkinud mitmeid küsitavusi. Esmalt on ebaselge sihtemitendi juhtorganite koosseis, kellele 
passiivsuskohustus rakendub ülevõtmispakkumise perioodil. Artikkel 9 (6) on andnud 
täpsustuse, et juhtorganite neutraalsuskohustus laieneb ka sihtemitendi nõukogule. Vaidlus 
juhtorganite koosseisu juures tekib pigem neutraalsuskohustuse laienemise üle sihtemitendi 
juhatusele (board) ja sihtemitendi tegevjuhatusele (management). Tõlgendamisel tuleb 
arvesse võtta, et aktsionäride suhtes võivad oma huvidest lähtuvalt ja oportunistlikult 
tegutseda kõik eelpool mainitud juhtorganite liikmed ning et neutraalsuskohustuse üheks 
peamiseks eesmärgiks on sihtemitendi aktsionäride huvide igakülgne kaitse. Seega võib 
neutraalsuskohustuse tõlgendamise põhjal väita, et kohustus laieneb nii sihtettevõtte 
tegevjuhtidele, juhatusele kui nõukogule.  
Lisaks eelnevale on tekitanud vaidlusi, milline on neutraalsuskohustuse ulatus. Ühelt 
poolt nõuab neutraalsuskohustuse regulatsioon ülevõtmispakkumiste direktiivis (ja näiteks ka 
Suurbritannia ettevõtete ülevõtmiste regulatsioon) sihtettemitendi juhtorganite ja nende 
liikmete ranget passiivsust ülevõtmispakkumise perioodil. Rangele neutraalsuskohustusele on 
lisatud teatud erandid. Nendeks eranditeks on näiteks olukorrad, kus juhtorgan on suuteline 
tõestama, et tegevus või tehtud otsus on kooskõlas sihtemitendi tavapärase äritegevusega või 
turu praktikaga. Samuti on lubatud sihtemitendi juhtorganitel otsida alternatiivseid pakkujaid 
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ja esitada omapoolne arvamus ülevõtmispakkumise kohta. Range neutraalsuskohustus peaks 
looma eeldused aktsionäride ülimuslikkuse doktriini toimimisele ja aktsionäride huvide kaitse 
mudeli edendamisele. Seesugune vaade on ennekõike levinud Anglo-Ameerika 
õigussüsteemis, mille esindajaks Euroopas on Suurbritannia, ja mille alusel kehtiv 
neutraalsuskohustus direktiivi lisati. 
Vastukaaluks eelnevale esindab arvukas hulk Mandri-Euroopa liikmesriikidest vaadet, 
mille kohaselt peaks sihtemitendi juhtorganite ja ennekõike juhatuse kohustus olema 
tasakaalustada erinevate ülevõtmispakkumisest mõjutatud gruppide huvisid – huvigruppide 
huvide kaitse mudel (stakeholder-model). Antud seisukoht on jäetud neutraalsuskohustuse 
lisamisel ülevõtmispakkumiste direktiivi arvestamata. Kuna aga mudel on laialdaselt toetatud 
paljude Mandri-Euroopa liikmesriikide poolt, siis tingis vastuolu neutraalsuskohustuse 
muutmise valikuliseks.  
Lisaks erisustele juhtorganite neutraalsuskohustuse regulatsioonis on vastuoluline ka 
selle rakendatavus Euroopa Liidu liikmesriikides. Vastavalt Artiklile 12 on liikmesriikidel 
õigus jätta neutraalsuskohustus kohustuslikus korras rakendamata, kuid liikmesriigid peavad 
jätma sihtemitentidele võimaluse neutraalsuskohustust rakendada vabatahtlikkuse alusel. 
Tulenevalt eelnevast on 19 liikmesriiki teinud sihtemitentide juhtorganite neutraalsuse 
kohustuslikuks. Samas ei ole arvestatav hulk Mandri-Euroopa suurte kapitaliturgudega 
liikmesriikidest, kes toetavad balansseeriva juhtorgani rolli ja huvigruppide huvide kaitse 
mudelit, neutraalsuskohustust kohustuslikus korras rakendanud – Saksamaa, Holland, Belgia, 
Luxemburg, Poola, Taani ja Ungari.  
Tulenevalt eelnevast on neutraalsuskohustuse regulatsioonil arvukalt erinevaid 
tagajärgi ja negatiivseid kõrvalmõjusid. Selle tulemusel võib väita, et esialgsed eesmärgid on 
vastavuses Artiklist 9 tulenevate tegelike mõjudega üksnes teatud ulatuses ning seda juhul, 
kui sihtemitendi juhtorganite neutraalsuskohustust on liikmesriigis rakendatud. Sellegipoolest 
on sihtemitendi juhtorganite neutraalsuskohustusel ja rakendamisel mitmed negatiivsed 
kõrvalmõjud – seaduslüngad, vaenulikud ülevõtmised ei ole pikas perspektiivis kasutoovad, 
passiivsuskohustus on muutnud Euroopa ettevõtted haavatavaks vaenulikele ülevõtmistele 
ning passiivsuskohustus mõjutab eriti tugevalt Mandri-Euroopa kontsentreeritud aktsionäride 
struktuuriga ettevõtteid. Lisaks on sihtemitendi juhtorganitelt võetud võimalus pidada 
läbirääkimisi ülevõtmistehingu tingimuste üle või võtta kasutusele meetmeid 
ülevõtmispakkumiste suhtes, mis tõenäoliselt ei ole kasulikud. Viimane on eriti aktuaalne 
Mandri-Euroopa liikmesriikides, mis pooldavad erinevate huvirühmade huvide  kaitsmise 
mudelit ja tasakaalustamist ülevõtmispakkumiste ajal sihtettevõtte juhtorganite poolt. 
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Ülevõtmispakkumiste direktiivi Artiklis 11 on sätestatud piirangute kohaldamise ja 
eriõiguste kasutamise keeld. Artikkel 11 reguleerib kaitsemehhanismide kasutamist, mis on 
kehtestatud või eksisteerivad sihtemitendis enne ülevõtmispakkumise tegemist – 
ülevõtmispakkumise eelsed kaitsemehhanismid (pre-bid defences). Nende eesmärgiks on 
nurjata vaenulik ülevõtmispakkumine ja muuta sihtemitendi omandamine ajaliselt ja rahaliselt 
kulukaks.  
Ülevõtmispakkumise eelsed kaitsemehhanismid on eelkõige erinevad piirangud, mis 
on seatud aktsiate või hääleõiguse võõrandamisele. Samuti erinevad kontrolli tõhustamise 
mehhanismid (control enhancing mechanisms), mis annavad aktsionäridele suurema kontrolli 
ettevõttes, kui on nende omatav aktsiate hulk. Seesuguste kontrollimehhanismide kasutatavus 
liikmesriikide ettevõtetes on märkimisväärne. Lisaks on nähtud tõket ettevõtete ülevõtmistele 
kontsentreeritud aktsionäride struktuuris, mistõttu peeti vajalikuks ka seesuguste struktuuride 
muutmine hajutatuks ja ülevõtmistele vastuvõtlikumaks.  
Ülevõtmispakkumise direktiivi Artiklile 11 seati mitmed eesmärgid, mille täitmine 
sooviti saavutada ülevõtmispakkumiste direktiivis sätestatud regulatsiooniga. Esiteks oli 
Artikli 11 eesmärgiks ülevõtmispakkumiste ja äriühingu kontrolli turu (market for corporate 
control) hõlbustamine. Teiseks oli Artikli 11 eesmärgiks sihtemitendi juhtorganite 
neutraalsuskohustuse poolt seatud piirangute täiendamine. Ühelt poolt täiustas Artikkel 11 
kaitsemehhanismide ulatust, mille kasutamisele ja rakendamisele laieneb ülevõtmispakkumise 
perioodil keeld. Samuti on Artikkel 11 erilise tähtsusega olukorras, kus ülevõtmispakkumise 
järgsed kaitsemehhanismid on keelatud, sest eelduslikult võtavad ettevõtted sellisel juhul 
kasutusele mehhanismid, mis keelatud ei ole. Kolmandaks oli Artikli 11 eesmärgiks 
agendiprobleemi (agency problem) lahendamine sihtemitendi juhtorganite ja aktsionäride 
ning vähemus- ja enamusaktsionäride vahel. Neljandaks oli Artikkel 11 suundatud erinevate 
kaitsemehhanismide neutraliseerimisele, mis muudavad ülevõtmise raskeks – kontrolli 
tõhustamise mehhanismide kõrvaldamine, hajutatud aktsionäride struktuuri edendamine ja 
proportsionaalsuse kehtestamine kapitali ja tegeliku kontrolli vahel, mida aktsionärid 
sihtemitendis omavad. Viimati nimetatud eesmärgid olid seatud selleks, et luua 
potentsiaalsetele omandajatele lihtsam ligipääs sihtemitendi kontrollile.   
 Artikkel 11 tõlgendamine on problemaatiline sarnaselt Artiklile 9. Esiteks ei ole 
selgelt määratletud Artikli 11 kohaldatavuse ulatus. Nimelt on Artikli 11 poolt keelatud teatud 
kontrolli tõhustavad mehhanismid samal ajal kui teised ei ole. Selline valikuline regulatsioon 
ei ole õigustatud, sest samasuguse mõjuga on ka need mehhanismid, mis ei ole reguleeritud 
Artikliga 11. Lisaks sellele soodustab regulatsioon ka hajutatud aktsionäride struktuuri 
arengut, mille kasulikkus võrreldes kontsentreeritud aktsionäride struktuuriga ei ole tõestatud. 
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Samuti on ebamäärane õiglase kompensatsiooni maksmise regulatsioon. Nimelt ei ole 
täpsustatud, millistel alustel tuleks otsustada kompensatsiooni suurus ning kes on kohustatud 
maksma kompensatsiooni. 
Lisaks vastuolulisele regulatsioonile näitab Artikli 11 ebaõnnestumist ka selle 
rakendamisstatistika – Artikkel 11 on kohustuslikuks tehtud vaid kolmes liikmesriigis.  
Liikmesriikide huvi puudumine artikli rakendamise vastu seisneb seisneb peamiselt asjaolus, 
et see muudaks mitmed liikmesriikide suurettevõtted kergesti ülevõetavaks, mis ei ole 
liikmesriikide huvides – protektsionism liikmesriigile majanduslikult oluliste ettevõtete 
suhtes.  
Vastavalt Artikli 11 regulatsiooni ja rakendamise analüüsile võib väita, et Artiklile 11 
seatud eesmärgid ei ole vastavuses antud artikli tegelike mõjudega juhul, seda on rakendatud 
või rakendatakse liikmesriigis. Enamgi veel, Artikli 11 rakendamine võib kaasa tuua mitmeid 
negatiivseid kõrvalmõjusid, mis põhjendab liikmesriikide marginaalset huvi selle 
rakendamise suhtes. Põhjuseid selleks on mitmeid, kuid ennekõike võib välja tuua asjaolu, et 
kehtestatud regulatsioon on mittetäielik ja ebaselge. Samuti on küsitav, kas artiklile seatud 
eesmärgid omavad kasu toovat väärtust kõigile ettevõtetele ja liikmesriikidele. Põhjendused 
eelnevale tulenevad ühelt poolt sellest, et Artiklis 11 toodud regulatsioon soodustab üksnes 
hajutatud aktsionäride struktuuriga ettevõtteid, samal ajal kui kontsentreeritud aktsionäride 
struktuuri (valdav Mandri-Euroopa ettevõtete seas) on nähtud selgelt negatiivselt. Kuna 
Artikli 11 mõjul muutuvad ettevõtted haavatavaks ülevõtmispakkumistele, ei ole liikmesriigid 
taolisest arengust huvitatud tulenevalt protektsionistlikust hoiakust riigi suurettevõtete suhtes.  
Lisaks Artiklitele 9 ja 11, mis reguleerivad otseselt ülevõtmispakkumise eelsete ja 
järgsete kaitsemehhanismide kasutamist, keskendub Artikkel 12 eelnevate artiklite 
rakendamise reguleerimisele nii liikmesriigi kui ettevõtete tasandil. Artikli 12 peamisteks 
eesmärkideks oli võrdsete võimalustega ala (level playing field) loomine nii Euroopa 
ettevõtete vahel kui ka Euroopa Liidu ja kolmandate riikide ettevõtete vahel. Samuti oli 
Artikli 12 lisamine ülevõtmispakkumiste direktiivi tarvilik kompromiss, mis  andis võimaluse 
võtta Artiklid 9 ja 11 vastu direktiivi osana. Nimelt oli direktiivi vastuvõtmine viibinud pikalt 
tulenevalt liikmesriikide negatiivsest vastureaktsioonist kaitsemehhanismide regulatsioonile. 
Artikkel 12 sätestab kaks võimalikku klauslit Artiklite 9 ja 11 rakendamiseks. Esmalt 
sätestab Artikkel 12 (1) ja (2) valikulisuse klausli (optionality clause), mille kohaselt ei ole 
liikmesriik kohustatud ettevõtetele tegema kohustuslikuks ei Artiklit 9 ega 11. Samas on 
liikmesriik kohustatud tegema võimalikuks ettevõtetele nendes sätestatu rakendamise 
vabatahtlikult, kui viimased seda vajalikuks peavad. Artikkel 12 (3) sätestab vastastikkuse 
klausli (reciprocity clause), mille kohaselt on ettevõtetel, kui liikmesriik on vastastikkuse 
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klausli rakendamise siseriiklikus õiguses võimalikuks teinud, võimalus mitte kohaldada 
Artiklit 9 ja 11, kui ülevõtmispakkuja vastavaid reegleid ei kohalda.  
Ühelt poolt oli Artikli 12 lisamine direktiivi vajalik selleks, et saavutada direktiivi 
vastuvõtmine ning ülevõtmispakkumiste suhtes ühtse regulatsiooni kehtestamine Euroopa 
Liidus. Teisalt neutraliseeris käesolev artikkel Artiklite 9 ja 11 kohustusliku kohaldamise 
nõude ning seega ka loodetud tulemused. Samuti muutis Artikkel 12 kaitsemehhanismide 
kasutatavuse keerukaks ning vastuoluliseks. Lisaks ei ole Artikkel 12 suutnud luua täielikku 
võrdsete võimalustega ala. Ebamäärasus tekib olukorras, kus sihtemitendi suhtes on tehtud 
mitu ülevõtmispakkumist erinevate liikmesriikide ettevõtete poolt. Samuti siis kui 
sihtemitendile on teinud ülevõtmispakkumise ettevõte kolmandast riigist, mille puhul on pole 
kindel, kas liikmesriigis kehtivad reeglid sarnased Artiklitele 9 ja 11.  
Kokkuvõtlikult võib väita, et Artikkel 12 tulemused on teatud määral vastavuses 
seatud eesmärkidega. Samas esineb artiklis ebaselgust ning probleeme artikli 
rakendatavusega. Artikkel 12 oli kahtlemata vajalik kompromiss direktiivi vastu võtmiseks. 
Siiski ei saa seda pidada pikaajaliseks lahenduseks, kuna Artiklist 12 tulenevad valikulised 
võimalused ei lahenda Artiklitest 9 ja 11 tulenevaid alusprobleeme. 
Kokkuvõttes ei pidanud magistritööle seatud hüpotees paika. Esialgsete eesmärkide 
vastavus Artiklite 9, 11 ja 12 tegelikele tulemustele eksisteerib teatud ulatuses või puudub. 
Lisaks eelnevale on Artiklite 9, 11 ja 12 regulatsioonil mitmeid negatiivseid kõrvalmõjusid, 
mida tuleks võtta arvesse kaitsemehhanismide regulatsiooni muudatuste tegemisel.  
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ANNEX 
 
Figure 1. The comparison of the number of takeovers in United Kingdom and 
Continental Europe 
 
 
Source: The Takeover Bids Directive Assessment Report. European Commission 2012. – Available: 
http://ec.europa.eu/internal_market/company/docs/takeoverbids/study/study_en.pdf  
 
 
 
Figure 2. Economic models 
 
Source: Source: The Takeover Bids Directive Assessment Report, European Commission 2012 available: 
http://ec.europa.eu/internal_market/company/docs/takeoverbids/study/study_en.pdf  
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Figure 3: Impact of the takeover regulation 
 
Source: The Takeover Bids Directive Assessment Report. European Commission 2012. – Available: 
http://ec.europa.eu/internal_market/company/docs/takeoverbids/study/study_en.pdf 
 
Figure 4. Changes in BNR-status and size of capital markets 
 
 
 
Source: P. Davis, E-P. Schuster, E. van de Walle de Ghelcke. Takeover Directive as a Protectionist Tool?. – 
European Corporate Governance Intitute Working paper No 141/2010. Available: 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1554616, (12.22.2012) 
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Figure 5:  Competitiveness and transposition of the Takeover Bids Directive 
 
 
Source: The Takeover Bids Directive Assessment Report. European Commission 2012. – Available: 
http://ec.europa.eu/internal_market/company/docs/takeoverbids/study/study_en.pdf 
 
Figure 6: Number of takeovers by location of the parties 
 
 
Source: The Takeover Bids Directive Assessment Report. European Commission 2012. – Available: 
http://ec.europa.eu/internal_market/company/docs/takeoverbids/study/study_en.pdf 
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Figure 7. Listed companies with under control blocking minority of at least 25% 
 
 
Source: M. Faccio, L.H.P. Lang. The ultimate ownership of Western European corporations. – Journal of 
Financial Economics, 2002/65 No 3 in Shearman & Sterling LLP. Proportionality between ownership and control 
in EU listed companies: Comparative Legal Study. 2007 External study commissioned by the European 
Commission. – Available: http://www.ecgi.org/osov/documents/study_report_en.pdf, (12.01.2014) 
 
 
Figure 8.   
 
Source: Shearman & Sterling LLP. Proportionality between ownership and control in EU listed companies: 
Comparative Legal Study. 2007 External study commissioned by the European Commission. – Available: 
http://www.ecgi.org/osov/documents/study_report_en.pdf, (12.01.2014) 
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Figure 9.  
 
Source: Shearman & Sterling LLP. Proportionality between ownership and control in EU listed companies: 
Comparative Legal Study. 2007 External study commissioned by the European Commission. – Available: 
http://www.ecgi.org/osov/documents/study_report_en.pdf, (12.01.2014) 
 
Figure 10.  
 
Source: Shearman & Sterling LLP. Proportionality between ownership and control in EU listed companies: 
Comparative Legal Study. 2007 External study commissioned by the European Commission. – Available: 
http://www.ecgi.org/osov/documents/study_report_en.pdf, (12.01.2014) 
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